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{{About|teori perang dan senjata nuklir|teori keadilan|Deterensi (hukum)}}{{Perang}}
'''Teori penggentar''' atau ''' deterensi''' mulai dikenal sebagai strategi militer pada masa [[Perang Dingin]] karena terkait dengan penggunaan [[senjata nuklir]]. Deterensi memiliki arti yang unik waktu itu karena berkat kekuatan nuklir yang menghancurkan, sebuah negara nuklir kecil dapat mencegah serangan musuhnya yang jauh lebih kuat asalkan mereka terlindungi dari kehancuran melalui serangan kejutan. ''Deterensi'' adalah strategi untuk [[diplomasi koersif|mencegah]] musuh mengambil tindakan yang belum dimulai, atau mencegah musuh melakukan sesuatu yang diharapkan negara lain. Menurut [[Bernard Brodie (strategiwan militer)|Bernard Brodie]] pada tahun 1959, deteren nuklir yang tepat harus selalu disiagakan dan tidak pernah digunakan.<ref name="Brodie_1959">
{{Citation
|last=Brodie
|first=Bernard
|year=1959
|title="The Anatomy of Deterrence" as found in Strategy in the Missile Age
|place=Princeton
|publisher=Princeton University Press
|chapter=8
|pages=264–304
}}</ref>
Dalam tulisan klasik [[Thomas Schelling]] (1966) tentang deterensi, ia memaparkan konsep bahwa strategi militer tidak bisa lagi dijadikan standar kemenangan militer. Ia berpendapat bahwa strategi militer saat ini lebih mengarah ke seni koersi atau intimidasi dan deterensi.<ref name="Schelling_1966">
{{Citation
|last=Schelling
|first=T. C.
|year=1966
|title=The Diplomacy of Violence
|place=New Haven
|publisher=Yale University Press
|chapter=2
|pages=1–34
}}</ref> Schelling mengatakan bahwa kemampuan untuk menghancurkan negara lain sudah dijadikan motivasi bagi negara lain untuk menghindarinya dan memengaruhi perilaku negara lain. Untuk bersikap koersif atau mencegah negara lain, kekerasan harus diantisipasi dan dihindari lewat akomodasi. Karena itu, dapat disimpulkan bahwa penggunaan kekuasaan untuk melukai sebagai daya tawar adalah dasar dari teori deterensi, dan deterensi sangat berhasil bila tidak digunakan.<ref name="Schelling_1966" />
Pada tahun 2004, Frank C. Zagrare mengutarakan pendapatnya bahwa teori deterensi tidak konsisten secara logis, tidak akurat secara empiris, dan banyak kelemahan. Sebagai pengganti deterensi klasik, para pakar pilihan rasional mengusulkan ''deterensi sempurna'' yang berasumsi bahwa setiap negara memiliki ciri khas internalnya masing-masing dan kredibilitas ancaman pembalasannya sendiri.<ref name="Zagare_2004">
{{Citation
|last=Zagare
|first=Frank C.
|year=2004
|title=Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory
|work=Journal of Theoretical Politics
|volume=16
|issue=2
|pages=107–141
}}</ref>
Dalam artikel di ''[[Wall Street Journal]]'' bulan Januari 2007, para pembuat kebijakan era [[Perang Dingin]], [[Henry Kissinger]], [[William Perry|Bill Perry]], [[George Shultz]], dan [[Sam Nunn]], mencabut pernyataannya dan menegaskan bahwa bukannya menjadikan dunia ini lebih aman, senjata nuklir justru merupakan sumber risiko yang besar.<ref name=globalzero>{{cite web |url=http://www.economist.com/node/18836134 |title=Nuclear endgame: The growing appeal of zero |date=June 16, 2011 |work=The Economist }}</ref> Pada tahun 2010, sejumlah negarawan senior dan tokoh wanita Eropa menuntut tindakan lebih lanjut dalam menangani masalah [[proliferasi senjata nuklir]]. Mereka mengatakan, "Deterensi nuklir bukanlah tanggapan strategis yang persuasif bagi dunia yang penuh perlombaan senjata nuklir regional dan terorisme nuklir, berbeda dengan era Perang Dingin".<ref name="Kåre Willoch, Kjell Magne Bondevik, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Ruud Lubbers, Jean-Luc Dehaene, Guy Verhofstadt, et al">{{cite web |url=http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/apr/14/nuclear-proliferation-washington-summit |title=Nuclear progress, but dangers ahead |author=[[Kåre Willoch]], [[Kjell Magne Bondevik]], [[Gro Harlem Brundtland]], [[Thorvald Stoltenberg]], [[Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz]], [[Ruud Lubbers]], [[Jean-Luc Dehaene]], [[Guy Verhofstadt]] |date=14 April 2010 |work=The Guardian |display-authors=etal}}</ref>
==Lihat pula==<!-- PLEASE RESPECT ALPHABETICAL ORDER -->
{{colbegin||22em}}
* [[Deterensi minimal]]
* [[Dilema keamanan]]
* [[Dilema tahanan]]
* [[Doktrin Reagan]]
* [[Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence]]
* [[Etika nuklir]]
* [[Hubungan internasional]]
* [[Kepastian saling menghancurkan]]
* [[Keseimbangan teror]]
* [[N-deterensi]]
* [[Paradoks waralaba]]
* [[Pembalasan besar]]
* [[Pemerasan nuklir]]
* [[Perang Dingin]]
* [[Perang nuklir]]
* [[Perdamaian melalui kekuatan]]
* [[Perdamaian nuklir]]
* [[Peringatan peluncuran]]
* [[Permainan perang]]
* [[Serangan kedua]]
* [[Serangan melumpuhkan]]
* [[Strategi nuklir]]
* [[Teori permainan]]
* [[Terorisme nuklir]]
* [[Tindakan kepercayaan diri]]
* [[Triad nuklir]]
{{colend}}
== Referensi ==
{{reflist|30em}}
* {{Cite web
|url=http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/do_joc_v20.doc
|title=U.S. Department of Defense's Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept
|format=Word
|accessdate=2011-10-11
|archive-date=2012-01-18
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120118163753/http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/do_joc_v20.doc
|dead-url=yes
}}
== Bacaan lanjutan ==
{{wikiversity|Survey research and design in psychology/Tutorials/Multiple linear regression/Exercises/Deterrence theory}}
* Freedman, Lawrence. 2004. ''Deterrence.'' New York: Polity Press.
* [[Robert Jervis|Jervis, Robert]], [[Richard Lebow|Richard N. Lebow]] and [[Janice Stein|Janice G. Stein]]. 1985. ''The Psychology of Deterrence''. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 270 pp.
* Morgan, Patrick. 2003. ''Deterrence Now.'' New York: Cambridge University Press.
* [[T.V. Paul]], [[Patrick M. Morgan]], [[James J. Wirtz]], ''Complex Deterrence: Strategy In the Global Age'' (University of Chicago Press, 2009) ISBN 978-0-226-65002-9
* Garcia Covarrubias, Jaime. The Significance of Conventional Deterrence in Latin America, March - April 2004
* [[Kenneth N. Waltz|Waltz, Kenneth N.]] Nuclear Myths and Political Realities. ''The American Political Science Review''. Vol. 84, No. 3 (Sep, 1990), pp. 731–746
== Pranala luar ==
* [http://acdis.illinois.edu/students/courses-current/focal-point-seminar/Vasquez-deterrence.html Nuclear Deterrence Theory and Nuclear Deterrence Myth] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100705041157/http://acdis.illinois.edu/students/courses-current/focal-point-seminar/Vasquez-deterrence.html |date=2010-07-05 }}, streaming video of a lecture by Professor John Vasquez, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS), University of Illinois, September 17, 2009.
* [http://www.ifri.org/downloads/Deterrence_Today_Dunn_2007.pdf Deterrence Today - Roles, Challenges, and Responses] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111207181216/http://ifri.org/downloads/Deterrence_Today_Dunn_2007.pdf |date=2011-12-07 }}, analysis by Lewis A. Dunn, IFRI Proliferation Papers n° 19, 2007
* [http://www.abolishnukes.com/short_essays/deterrence_theory_whitmore.html Revisiting Nuclear Deterrence Theory] {{Webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20130110162532/http://www.abolishnukes.com/short_essays/deterrence_theory_whitmore.html |date=2013-01-10 }} by Donald C. Whitmore — March 1, 1998
* [http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2001/04/00_krieger_nuclear-deterrence.htm Nuclear Deterrence, Missile Defenses, and Global Instability] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040626062504/http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2001/04/00_krieger_nuclear-deterrence.htm |date=2004-06-26 }} by David Krieger, April 2001
* [http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~paulmacd/cwbiblio.htm Bibliography] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110927020926/http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~paulmacd/cwbiblio.htm |date=2011-09-27 }}
* [http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/Jun16NuclearMG.pdf Maintaining Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050814205651/http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/Jun16NuclearMG.pdf |date=2005-08-14 }} by the Senate Republican Policy Committee
* [http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-deterrence.htm Nuclear Files.org] Description and analysis of the nuclear deterrence theory
* [http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/ethics/issues/military/butler_risk-nuclear-deterrence.htm Nuclear Files.org] Speech by US General Lee Butler in 1998 on the Risks of Nuclear Deterrence
* [http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/ethics/issues/scientific/rotblat_ethical-dimensions-deterrence.htm Nuclear Files.org] Speech by Sir Joseph Rotblat, Nobel Peace Laureate, on the Ethical Dimensions of Deterrence
* [http://www.charlessutherland.com/1.html The Universal Formula for Successful Deterrence] by Charles Sutherland, 2007. A predictive tool for deterrence strategies.
* [http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/oaw/poa/pdf/TEAS20.pdf Will the Eagle strangle the Dragon?] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080410131505/http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/oaw/poa/pdf/TEAS20.pdf |date=2008-04-10 }}, Analysis of how the Chinese nuclear deterrence is altered by the U.S. [[Ballistic Missile Defense|BMD]] system, ''Trends East Asia'', No. 20, February 2008.
* [http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Winter/schaub.pdf When is Deterrence Necessary? Gauging Adversary Intent] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171203140852/http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Winter/schaub.pdf |date=2017-12-03 }} by Gary Schaub,Jr., [http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Winter/Winter09.pdf ''Strategic Studies Quarterly'' 3, 4 (Winter 2009)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170210011824/http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Winter/Winter09.pdf |date=2017-02-10 }}
* [http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2006/rg00054t.pdf The significance of conventional deterrence in Latin America]
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[[Kategori:Istilah Perang Dingin]]
[[Kategori:Istilah geopolitik]]
[[Kategori:Teori hubungan internasional]]
[[Kategori:Keamanan internasional]]
[[Kategori:Strategi militer]]
[[Kategori:Strategi nuklir]]
[[Kategori:Perang nuklir]]
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