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{{about|Pensinyalan dalam biologi evolusioner|Teori serupa dalam ekonomi|Pensinyalan (ekonomi)|Konsep rekayasa|Teori sinyal}}
[[Berkas:Springbok pronk.jpg|thumbjmpl|225px|[[Springbok]] muda ''Antidorcas marsupialis'' "[[Stotting]]" atau "pronking" bisa mensinyalkan secara jujur kepada [[pemangsa]] seperti [[macan tutul]] bahwa ia adalah hewan yang bugar dan cepat, tidak layak dikejar.]]▼
 
▲[[Berkas:Springbok pronk.jpg|thumb|225px|[[Springbok]] muda ''Antidorcas marsupialis'' "[[Stotting]]" atau "pronking" bisa mensinyalkan secara jujur kepada [[pemangsa]] seperti [[macan tutul]] bahwa ia adalah hewan yang bugar dan cepat, tidak layak dikejar.]]
 
Dalam [[biologi evolusioner]], '''teori pensinyalan''' adalah sekumpulan [[teori]] yang membedah komunikasi antara individu.
Pusat pertanyaannya adalah kapan organisme yang memiliki konflik kepentingan diharapkan berkomunikasi secara jujur (tidak ada praduga mengenai intensi yang disengaja).
Baris 10 ⟶ 8:
Sinyal selalu berubah karena ia mengubah perilaku dari penerima untuk menguntungkan pemberi sinyal.
Sinyal bisa saja jujur, meningkatkan kesesuaiannya, atau tidak jujur.
Suatu tipuan bisa memberikan sinyal tidak jujur, menghasilkan suatu keuntungan, tapitetapi secara potensial melemahkan sistem pensinyalan secara keseluruhan.
 
Pertanyaan apakah seleksi sinyal bekerja pada tingkat organisme individu atau gen, atau pada tingkat kelompok, telah diperdebatkan oleh para biologiawan seperti [[Richard Dawkins]], yang berpendapat bahwa individu berkembang untuk memberi dan menerima sinyal lebih baik, termasuk bertahan terhadap manipulasi.
Baris 18 ⟶ 16:
Ahli biologi matematis [[Ronald Fisher]] menganalisis kontribusi bahwa memiliki dua salinan dari setiap gen [[diploid]] akan menyebabkan pensinyalan jujur, menunjukan bahwa suatu [[Kendali Fisherian|efek terkendali]] bisa terjadi dalam [[seleksi seksual]], bergantung kepada keseimbangan biaya dan keuntungan.
 
Mekanisme yang sama juga bisa dilihat pada manusia, saat para peneliti telah mempelajari perilaku termasuk pengambilan resikorisiko oleh anak muda, berburu hewan besar, dan ritual agama berbiaya, menemukan bahwa hal tersebut termasuk sinyal jujur berbiaya.
 
== Seleksi seksual ==
Baris 36 ⟶ 34:
{{further|Komunikasi bawah sadar|Altruisme resiprokal}}
 
[[Berkas:2012-06-09 16-04-22 Switzerland Kanton Graubünden Sagliaz cropped.JPG|thumbjmpl|Eurasian jay, ''[[Garrulus glandarius]]'', memberikan sinyal jujur -- teriakan peringatan keras -- dari pohon saat ia melihat seekor pemangsa]]
 
Dalam biologi, sinyal merupakan sifat, termasuk struktur dan perilaku, yang telah berkembang secara spesifik karena mereka mengubah perilaku penerima sinyal dengan suatu cara yang menguntungkan pengirim sinyal.
Baris 55 ⟶ 53:
Konsep kejujuran dalam komunikasi hewan adalah kontroversial karena ia sangat susah untuk menentukan maksud dan penggunaan, sebagai suatu kriteria untuk membedakan penipuan dari kejujuran, sebagaimana yang kita lakukan dalam interaksi manusia.<ref>Getty 1997</ref>
Ahli biologi menggunakan frasa "sinyal jujur" dalam artian statistik.
Sinyal-sinyal biologis, seperti teriakan peringatan atau bulu ekor yang gemerlapan, dianggap jujur jika mereka berkorelasi dengan sesuatu yang berguna bagi penerima, yaitu, sifat sinyal {{efn|Ahli ekonomi menyebut apa yang tersedia bagi penerima dengan "informasi publik".}} berkorelasi dengan suatu nilai yang tak terobservasi bagi penerima sinyal {{efn|Ahli ekonomi menyebut apa yang tidak bisa diobservasi tapitetapi memiliki nilai bagi penerima dengan "informasi privat"; ahli biologi sering menyebutnya dengan "kualitas"}}.
Sinyal biologis jujur tidak perlu secara sempurna bersifat informatif, mengurangi ketidakpastian ke angka nol; mereka hanya perlu untuk jujur "secara rata-rata" untuk berpotensi berguna.<ref>Johnstone 1993</ref>
Pada akhirnya [[Nilai informasi|nilai]] dari informasi yang disinyalkan bergantung kepada tingkat yang membolehkan penerima sinyal untuk meningkatkan [[Kesesuaian (biologi)|kesesuaiannya]].<ref>Dall 2005</ref>
Oleh karena itu, sinyal-sinyal "jujur" adalah evolusioner stabil.
 
== Sinyal tak-jujurtakjujur ==
 
[[Berkas:Uca lactea-male-600-450.jpg|thumbjmpl|leftkiri|[[Kepiting capit]] jantan memainkan sinyal caping dengan pencapitnya yang dibesarkan, tapitetapi capit lemah yang baru tumbuh bisa menjadi sinyal tak-jujurtakjujur.]]
 
Karena adanya keuntungan mutual dan konflik kepentingan dalam kebanyakan sistem pensinyalan hewan, pusat permasalahan dalam teori pensinyalan adalah ketidakjujuran atau [[kecurangan (biologi)|kecurangan]].
Baris 71 ⟶ 69:
<ref name="Dawkins and Krebs 1978">Dawkins and Krebs 1978</ref>
Contoh dari sinyal tak jujur ada pada kepiting capit seperti ''[[Uca lactea mjoebergi]]'', yang telah diketahui menggertak (tanpa adanya intensi kesadaran tersirat) tentang kemampuan tarung mereka.
Bila sebuah capit hilang, seekor kepiting biasanya menumbuhkan kembali capit yang lebih lemah yang tetap bisa mengintimidasi kepiting lain dengan capit kecil tapitetapi kuat.
<ref>BES 2008</ref><ref>Lailvaux 2008</ref>
Proporsi dari sinyal tak jujur cukup rendah sehingga tidak perlu bagi kepiting untuk menguji kejujuran setiap sinyal lewat bertarung.
Baris 88 ⟶ 86:
{{main|Prinsip rintangan}}
 
[[Berkas:Curlin in the Final Turn in the 2008 Stephen Foster Handicap (2972085393).jpg|thumbjmpl|300px|Kuda terbaik dalam [[lomba rintangan]] membawa beban terbesar, jadi ukuran dari rintangan adalah perhitungan dari kualitas hewan.]]
 
Pada tahun 1975, [[Amotz Zahavi]] mengajukan suatu model verbal tentang bagaimana biaya sinyal dapat membatasi kecurangan dan menstabilkan suatu korelasi "jujur" antara sinyal yang diobservasi dan kualitas yang tak terobservasi, berdasarkan pada suatu analogi pada sistem olahraga rintangan.
Baris 106 ⟶ 104:
<ref>Feldhamer, 2007. p. 423.</ref>
 
[[Berkas:Flickr - lo.tangelini - Tonos (1).jpg|leftkiri|thumbjmpl|[[Burung merak]] mensinyalkan kesesuaian reproduktif dengan ekornya yang berwarna dan besar, kemungkinan karena ia adalah sebuah [[prinsip rintangan|rintangan]].]]
 
Esensi ide di sini adalah intuitif dan kemungkinan dianggap sebagai [[kebajikan kuno]].
Baris 117 ⟶ 115:
<ref>Veblen 1899</ref>
 
[[Berkas:Irish Elk front.jpg|thumbjmpl|[[Tanduk]] besar dari rusa Irlandia, ''[[Megaloceros giganteus]]',' mungkin berkembang untuk menunjukkan kemampuan untuk melewati rintangan.]]
 
Kesimpulan Zahavi berakhir pada interpretasi verbalnya pada suatu metafora, dan pada awalnya prinsip rintangan tidak begitu diterima oleh para ahli biologi evolusioner.
<ref name="Z&Z97"/>
Namun, pada tahun 1984, Nur dan Hasson
<ref name="N&H84">Nur 1984</ref>
menggunakan teori sejarah kehidupan untuk memperlihatkan bagaimana perbedaan dalam biaya pensinyalan, dalam bentuk biaya ketahanan-reproduksi, dapat menstabilkan sistem pensinyalan hampir sama dengan yang dibayangkan Zahavi.
Baris 129 ⟶ 127:
<ref name="Grafen90">Grafen 1990</ref>
 
Pada tahun 1982, [[W.D. Hamilton]] mengajukan mekanisme rintangan spesifik tapitetapi digunakan secara luas, [[seleksi seksual]] dimediasi-[[parasit]].
<ref>Hamilton 1982</ref>
Dia berargumen bahwa dalam perlombaan ko-evolusioner tanpa-henti antara inang dan parasit mereka, sinyal-sinyal yang terpilih secara seksual mengindikasikan kesehatan.
Baris 137 ⟶ 135:
<ref>Møller 1994</ref>
 
Contoh lainnya adalah ide bahwa [[karotenoid]] memiliki peran ganda tapitetapi secara resiprokal tidak sesuai dengan fungsi [[imun]] dan pensinyalan.
<ref>Lozano 1994</ref>
Karena hewan tidak bisa mensintesis karotenoid ''de novo'', ia harus didatangkan dari makanan.
Baris 162 ⟶ 160:
 
Upaya untuk menemukan bagaimana biaya dapat membatasi suatu korelasi "jujur" antara sinyal yang bisa diobservasi dan kualitas sinyal yang tak terobservasi di antara pensinyal dibangun dalam model strategis dari permainan pensinyalan, dengan banyak asumsi-asumsi yang disederhanakan.
Model-model tersebut sering digunakan untuk ''[[seleksi seksual|pensinyalan terpilih seksual]]'' pada hewan [[diploid]], tapitetapi mereka jarang menggabungkan fitur penting reproduksi seksual yang ditunjukkan oleh [[R.A.Fisher|Ronald Fisher]] pada awal abad 20-an: jika memang ada "gen pilihan" terkait dengan pemilihan pada betina sebagaimana "gen sinyal" terkait dengan sifat penampilan pada pejantan, betina yang pemilih seharusnya condong kawin dengan pejantan yang mencolok.
Selama beberapa generasi, anak dari pejantan yang mencolok seharusnya juga membawa gen yang terkait dengan anak perempuan yang pemilih dan anak perempuan pemilih juga seharusnya membawa gen yang terkait dengan anak yang mencolok.
Korelasi ini bisa mengenalkan evolusioner dinamis yang dikenal sebagai [[pelarian Fisherian]].
Baris 177 ⟶ 175:
== Contoh-contoh ==
 
[[Berkas:Autumn.westonbirt.750pix.jpg|thumbjmpl|rightka|Salah satu teori adlah bahwa warna musim gugur merupakan suatu sinyal dari pohon kepada [[kutu daun]] tentang adanya pertahanan kimia yang kuat.]]
 
Sam Brown dan [[W. D. Hamilton]]
Baris 184 ⟶ 182:
<ref name=Archetti2000>>Archetti 2000</ref>
mengajukan ide bahwa [[warna daun musim gugur]] adalah sinyal pohon kepada [[kutu daun]] dan spesies serangga lain yang bermigrasi ke pohon di musim gugur.
Menurut teori mereka, warna cerah merah jambu dan kuning saat musim gugur berbiaya bagi pohon karena pigmen membutuhkan energi untuk disinteisis, tapitetapi investasi tersebut bisa membantu mereka mengurangi jumlah parasit.
<ref name=Hamilton2001/><ref name=Archetti2000/>
 
Baris 194 ⟶ 192:
Perilaku manusia juga bisa sebagai contoh sinyal berbiaya.
Secara umum, sinyal-sinyal tersebut memberikan inforasi tentang kualitas fenotip seseorang atau kecenderungan bekerjasama.
Bukti bagi sinyal berbiaya telah ditemukan dalam banyak wilayah interaksi manusia termasuk pengambilan resikorisiko, berburu, dan agama,
<ref name="Bliege Bird et al. 2001"/>
yang didiskusian nantinya di bawah.
Baris 200 ⟶ 198:
=== Pensinyalan berbiaya dalam berburu ===
 
[[Berkas:Kalina hunter gatherer.jpg|thumbjmpl|leftkiri|Pemburu pria dan pengumpul wanita dari masyarakat Kali'na di Guyana, digambar oleh tahun 1743. Berbagi dengan murah hati oleh pemburu pria bisa sebagai "sinyal berbiaya", membantu mereka mendapatkan pasangan.]]
 
Permainan berburu yang besar telah dikaji secara ekstensif sebagai suatu sinyal dari keinginan lelaki untuk mengambil risiko fisik, sebagaimana juga memperlihatkan kekuatan dan kerjasama.
Baris 268 ⟶ 266:
Di antara pria dari pulau karang [[Ifaluk]], teori pensinyalan berbiaya dapat menjelaskan kenapa pria mengobori ikan.
<ref name="Sosis 2000">Sosis 2000</ref>
Mengobori ikan adalah metodametode ritualisasi ikan pada Ifaluk dengan pria menggunakan obor terbuat dari daun kelapa kering untuk menangkap ikan tuna besar.
Persiapan untuk pengoboran ikan membutuhkan investasi waktu lebih dan membutuhkan kerjasama yang besar.
Karena biaya waktu dan energi untuk persiapan, pengoboran ikan menghasilkan kehilangan kalori bagi nelayan.
Oleh karena itu, pengoboran ikan adalah suatu rintangan yang digunakan untuk mensinyalkan produktifitasproduktivitas pria.
<ref name="Sosis 2000"/>
Pengoboran ikan adalah pekerjaan memancing yang paling terkenal di Ifaluk.
Baris 319 ⟶ 317:
<ref name="Hawkes et al. 2002"/>
 
=== ResikoRisiko fisik sebagai suatu sinyal berbiaya ===
 
[[Berkas:Motorcycle racing.jpg|thumbjmpl|225px|Anak muda mungkin ambil bagian di olahraga berbahaya seperti [[balap motor]] untuk mensinyalkan kekuatan dan kemampuan mereka.]]
 
Pensinyalan berbiaya bisa digunakan pada situasi lain yang mengikutkan sifat fisik dan risiko luka fisik atau kematian.
Baris 332 ⟶ 330:
Mengemudi ugal-ugalan secara khususnya merupakan masalah mematikan di antara remaja dan anak muda di masyarakat barat.
<ref>Nell 2001</ref>
Seorang pria yang melakukan risiko fisik mengirimkan pesan bahwa dia memiliki kekuatan dan kemampuan yang cukup untuk bertahan pada aktivitas berbahaya yang ekstrimekstrem.
Sinyal ini diarahkan kepada teman dan pasangan potensial.
<ref name="Zahavi 1975">Zahavi 1975</ref>
 
Dalam sebuah penelitian mengenai pengambilan resikorisiko, beberapa tipe resikorisiko, seperti resikorisiko fisik atau heroik untuk keuntungan orang lain, dilihat lebih disukai daripada tipe resikorisiko yang lainnya, seperti meminum obat-obatan.
Pria dan wanita menghargai beberapa tingkat dari risiko heroik bagi pasangan dan teman sesama jenis.
Pria menghargai pengambilan risiko heroik oleh teman pria, tapitetapi kurang menyukainya pada pasangan wanita.
Wanita menghargai pengambilan risiko heroik pada pasangan pria dan kurang para teman wanita.
Wanita mungkin lebih tertarik kepada pria yang cenderung secara fisik melindungi mereka dan anak mereka.
Baris 344 ⟶ 342:
<ref name=Farthing2005/>
 
Di masyarakat barat, [[donor darah]] sukarela adalah bentuk umum, walau kurang ekstrimekstrem, dari mengambil risiko.
Biaya dari donasi ini termasuk sakit dan resikorisiko infeksi.
<ref>Schreiber et al. 2006</ref>
Jika donasi darah adalah sebuah kesempatan untuk mengirimkan sinyal berbiaya, maka para pendonor akan dianggap oleh orang lain sebagai dermawan dan sehat secara fisik.
Baris 355 ⟶ 353:
=== Agama sebagai sinyal berbiaya ===
 
[[Berkas:Handling of serpents, a part of the ceremony at the Pentecostal Church of God. This coal camp offers none of the... - NARA - 541340.jpg||thumbjmpl|uprightlurus|leftkiri|Ritual agama seperti [[memegang ular]] mungkin bisa dijelaskan sebagai sinyal berbiaya dalam istilah evolusioner.]]
 
Ritual agama berbiaya seperti sunat pada pria, kekurangan makanan dan air (puasa), dan [[memegang ular]]; tampak paradoks dalam makna evolusioner.
Baris 375 ⟶ 373:
 
Irons mengajukan bahwa teori pensinyalan berbiaya dapat menjelaskan perilaku beragama yang berbiaya.
Dia berargumen bahwa tampilan keagaamankeagamaan yang susah-dipalsukan meningkatkan kepercayaan dan solidaritas dalam suatu komunitas, memproduksi keuntungan emosional dan ekonomis.
Dia mendemonstrasikan sinyal-sinyal tampilan di antara [[Yomut]] [[Orang Iran Turkmen|Turkmen]] di [[Iran]] utara membantu mengamankan persetujuan dagang.
Tontonan yang "sok pamer" tersebut mensinyalkan komitmen kepada Islam kepada orang asing dan anggota kelompok.
<ref>Irons 1996</ref>
Sosis mendemonstrasikan bahwa orang dalam komunitas agama empat kali lebih mungkin hidup lebih lama daripada teman sekularsekuler mereka,
<ref name="Sosis 2000"/>
<ref name="Bulbulia 2004"/>
Baris 429 ⟶ 427:
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{{Refend}}
 
== TautanPranala luar ==
 
* {{en}} [http://octavia.zoology.washington.edu/handicap/ An Introduction to the Theory of Honest Signalling] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150224083708/http://octavia.zoology.washington.edu/handicap/ |date=2015-02-24 }}
* {{en}} [http://www.animalbehavioronline.com/deceit.html Perilaku hewan online: penipuan]
* {{en}} [http://jom.sagepub.com/content/37/1/39 Journal of Management: Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment ] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150216125907/http://jom.sagepub.com/content/37/1/39 |date=2015-02-16 }} (2011, behind paywall)
 
{{evo ecol}}
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