Edmund Husserl: Perbedaan antara revisi
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===Gottlob Frege and Husserl's Anti-Psychologist Turn===
It has been suggested by some analytic philosophers that Edmund Husserl after obtaining his PhD in mathematics, began analysing the foundations of mathematics from a rather psychological point of view, as Brentano's disciple. In his professorship doctoral dissertation called "On the Concept of Number" (1886) and his ''Philosophy of Arithmetic'' (1891) Husserl enhanced the approach taken by Weierstrass and other mathematicians of the time in defining the natural numbers by counting with Brentano's methods of descriptive psychology. Later, when attacking the psychologistic point of view of logic and mathematics in the first volume of his ''Logical Investigations'' called "The Prolegomena of Pure Logic", he appears to reject much of his early work, though the forms of psychologism analysed and refuted in the ''Prolegomena'' do not apply directly to his ''Philosophy of Arithmetic''. While some scholars point to [[Gottlob Frege]]'s negative review of the ''Philosophy of Arithmetic'', this did not turn Husserl towards Platonism, as he had already discovered the work of [[Bernhard Bolzano]] around 1890/91 and explicitly mentions Bolzano, Leibniz and Lotze as inspirations for his newer position.
{{quote|The Frege industry routinely informs us that the review quite transformed poor Husserl's philosophy; but elementary attention to chronology and sources (Hill 1991a, pt. 1) shows that this claim refers far more to the False than to the True.|Grattann-Guinness "The Search for Mathematical Roots 1870-1948", p. 204}}
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For example, the review falsely attributes to Husserl the view that he subjectivizes everything so no objectivity is possible, and also falsely attributed to him a notion of abstraction whereby the objects disappear until we are left with the number (or at least with two ghosts). Contrary to what Frege states, already in Husserl's ''Philosophy of Arithmetic'' we find two different kinds of representations: a subjective representation and objective representation. Objectivity is clearly stated in that work. Frege's attack seems rather to be addressed at the ides on the foundations of mathematics current in the Berlin School of Weierstrass, of which Husserl and Cantor, however, can not be said to be orthodox representatives.
Furthermore, from various sources it is quite clear that Husserl changed his mind about psychologism as early as 1890, a year before his ''Philosophy of Arithmetic'' was published. Husserl stated that when it was published, he had already changed his mind. In fact, he says that he had doubts about psychologism from the very beginning. He attributed his change of mind to [[Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz]], [[Bernard Bolzano]], [[Rudolf Hermann Lotze]], and [[David Hume]].<ref>''Husserl-Chronik'', p. 25-26</ref> He makes no mention of Frege as being decisive for the change. In his ''Logical Investigations'', Husserl mentions Frege only twice, one of them in a footnote to point out that he retracted three pages of his criticim of Frege's ''The Foundations of Arithmetic'', and the other one was to question Frege's use of the word ''Bedeutung'' to designate reference rather than meaning (sense).
About the difference of sense and reference, Frege thanked Husserl in a letter dated May 24, 1891 for sending him a copy of ''Philosophy of Arithmetic'' and Husserl's review of E. Schröder's ''Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik'', and in that same letter, he takes Husserl's review of Schröder's book to compare both his and Husserl's notion of sense of reference of concept words. In other words, Frege ''did'' recognize, as early as 1891, that Husserl made the difference between sense and reference. The inevitable conclusion is that Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl, before 1891, independently reached a theory of sense and reference.
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==Philosophers influenced by Husserl==
[[Hermann Weyl]]'s interest in [[intuitionistic logic]] and [[impredicativity]] appears to have resulted from contacts with Husserl.
[[Rudolf Carnap]] was also influenced by Husserl, not only concerning Husserl's notion of essential insight that Carnap used in his ''Der Raum'', but also his notion of "formation rules" and "transformation rules" is founded on Husserl's philosophy of logic.
[[Max Scheler]] met Husserl in Halle and found in his phenomenology a methodological breakthrough for his own philosophical endeavors. Even though Scheler later criticised Husserl's idealistic logical approach and proposed instead a "phenomenology of love", he states that he remained "deeply indebted" to Husserl throughout his work. Husserl also had some influence on Pope [[John-Paul II]], which appears strongly in a work by the latter, ''The Acting Person'', or ''Person and Act''. It was originally published in polish in 1969 under his pre-papal name Karol Wojtyla and combined phenomenological work with [[Thomas Aquinas|Thomistic]] Ethics.<ref>{{citation |last=Wojtyla |first=Karol |author-link=Pope John Paul II |title=The Acting Person: A Contribution to Phenomenological Anthropology |publisher=Springer |year=2002 |isbn=90-277-0985-8 }}</ref>
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{{Persondata
|NAME= Husserl, Edmund
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|PLACE OF DEATH=[[Freiburg]], [[Jerman]]
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Husserl, Edmund Gustav Albrecht}}
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