Perang Dingin

Perang Dingin (1947-1991) adalah sebuah "perang" di mana pasukan kedua musuh utamanya sebenarnya tidak pernah saling bertarung. Istilah "Dingin" digunakan untuk menjelaskan hubungan antara Amerika Serikat (beserta sekutunya disebut Blok Barat) dan Uni Soviet (beserta sekutunya disebut Blok Timur) selama masa 45 tahun setelah berakhirnya Perang Dunia II. Ditakutkan bahwa perang ini akan berakhir dengan perang nuklir, yang akhirnya tidak terjadi.

Perang Dingin berkaitan dengan banyak perang lokal lainnya seperti Perang Korea, invasi Soviet terhadap Hungaria dan Cekoslovakia dan Perang Vietnam. Hasil dari Perang Dingin termasuk (dari beberapa sudut pandang) kediktatoran di Yunani dan Amerika Selatan. Krisis Rudal Kuba juga adalah akibat dari Perang Dingin dan Krisis Timur Tengah juga telah menjadi lebih kompleks akibat Perang Dingin. salah satu dampak perang dingin dengan negara jerman adalah terbaginya jerman menjadi dua bagian yaitu jerman barat dan timur(tembok berlin)

Sejarah

Latar belakang

Kehadiran dan kekuatan Nazi Jerman memaksa pasukan Sekutu Barat dan pasukan Soviet bersatu untuk menghadapinya. Bagaimanapun, sejak awal aliansi antara Uni Soviet, negara komunis pertama di dunia, Amerika Serikat, negara kapitalis terkaya di dunia, dan Britania Raya, kerajaan terbesar di dunia, diwarnai oleh saling ketidakpercayaan dan tekanan ideologi.

The Wisconsin school of interpretation argues that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were economic rivals that made them natural adversaries regardless of ideology.^[1] Walter LaFeber argues the U.S. and Imperial Russia became rivals by 1900 over the development of Manchuria. Russia, unable to compete industrially with the U.S., sought to close off parts of East Asia to trade with other colonial powers. Meanwhile, the U.S demanded open competition for markets. ^[2]

Benturan ideologi antara Komunisme dan kapitalisme dimulai pada tahun 1917 setelah terjadinya Revolusi Russia. Pada perang dunia I, Amerika serikat, Britania, dan Russia bersekutu sampai akhirnya Bolshevik memegang pemerintahan Soviet pada tahun 1917. Pada tahun 1918, Bolsheviks menegosiasikan perjanjian damai secara terpisah dengan Central Powers dalam Perjanjian Brest-Litovsk; dan dengan Sekutu Barat yang sempat ikut campur dalam Perang Saudara Russia melawan tentara revolusi. Setelah perang selesai, Amerika Serikat menolak untuk mengakui keberadaan Uni Soviet sampai tahun 1933.^[3] Setelah memenangkan perang saudara (lihat Perang Saudara Russia), Bolsheviks memproklamirkan gerakan anti-kapitalis berskala dunia (Fred Halliday).

The period of prewar diplomacy also left both sides wary of the other's intentions and motives in World War II. Each feared that the other might pull out of the war effort and make a separate settlement with Germany. Moscow recalled Western appeasement of Adolf Hitler after the signing of the Munich Pact in 1938. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt feared Joseph Stalin would once more make a settlement with Germany, as he had done in August 1939 with the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact. (LaFeber 1991) From 1941 to 1945, the alliance was only a temporary aberration in the post-1890s relationship between Russia and America. (LaFeber 1991)

During the war, the Soviets were deeply suspicious of the U.S. military tactics and strategies. The Soviets believed at the time, and charged throughout the Cold War, that the British and Americans intentionally delayed the opening of a second front against Germany. (Gaddis, 151) As early as July 1941, Stalin had asked the UK to invade northern France, but the British were in no position to carry out the request. (Gaddis, 149) The second front was ultimately constituted on June 6, 1944, or D-Day. The Soviets suspected that the Anglo-Americans had decided to allow the Russians to bear the brunt of the war effort, but would intervene at the last minute to influence the peace settlement and dominate Europe. (Gaddis, 151) Historians such as John Lewis Gaddis dispute this claim, citing other military and strategic calculations for the timing of the Normandy invasion. (Gaddis, 151-153) But Soviet perceptions—or misperceptions—of the West and vice versa left an undercurrent of tensions and hostility between the Allied powers.

Moreover, both sides held very dissimilar concepts of establishing postwar security. Americans tended to understand security in situational terms, assuming that if U.S.-style governments and markets were established as widely as possible, states could resolve their differences peacefully through international organizations. (Gaddis, 176) The key to the U.S. vision of security was a postwar world shaped according to the principles laid out in the Atlantic Charter in 1941—a liberal international system based on free trade and open markets. This vision would require a rebuilt capitalist Europe with a healthy Germany at its center that could again serve as a hub in world affairs. (LaFeber 1991) It would also require U.S. economic and political leadership of the postwar world. Europe needed U.S. assistance to rebuild their domestic production and to finance their international trade. The U.S. was the only world power not economically devastated by the fighting. By the end of the war, the U.S. produced around fifty percent of the world's industrial goods. (LaFeber 1991)

Soviet leaders, however, tended to understand security in terms of space. (Gaddis, 176) This reasoning was conditioned by Russia's historical experiences, given the frequency with which their country had been invaded over the previous 150 years. (Gaddis, p. 176) The experiences of the Second World War were particularly dramatic for the Russians. The Soviet Union suffered unprecedented devastation as a result of the Nazi onslaught, and over 20 million Soviet citizens died during the war. Tens of thousands of Soviet cities, towns, and villages were leveled; and 30,100 Soviet factories were destroyed. ^[4] In order to prevent a similar assault in the future, Stalin was determined to use the Red Army to control Poland, dominate the Balkans, and destroy Germany's capacity for another war. However Stalin's strategy risked confrontation with the much more powerful United States.

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Allies attempted to define the framework for a postwar settlement in Europe. The Allies could not reach firm agreements on the crucial questions: the occupation of Germany, postwar reparations from Germany, and loans. No final consensus was reached on Germany, other than to agree to a Soviet request for reparations totaling $10 billion "as a basis for negotiations." (Gaddis, 164) Debates over the composition of Poland's postwar government were also acrimonious. (LaFeber 2002, 15)

Following the Allied victory in May, the Soviets effectively occupied the countries of Eastern Europe; and the U.S. occupied much of Western Europe. In occupied Germany the U.S. and the Soviet Union—the world's two superpowers, along with the waning colonial powers of Britain and France, established zones of occupation and a loose framework for four-power control.

Harry S. Truman and Joseph Stalin meeting at the Potsdam Conference on July 18, 1945. From left to right, first row: Stalin, Truman, Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. Second row: Truman confidant Harry Vaughan [1], Russian interpreter Charles Bohlen, Truman naval aide James K. Vardaman, Jr., and Charles Griffith Ross (partially obscured) [2].

At the Potsdam Conference starting in late July, serious differences emerged over the future development of Germany and Eastern Europe.^[5] At Potsdam, the U.S. was represented by a new president, Harry S. Truman, who on April 12 succeeded to the office upon Roosevelt's death. Truman was unaware of Roosevelt's plans for postwar engagement with Soviet Union, and generally uninformed about foreign policy and military matters. (Schmitz) Therefore, the new president was initially reliant upon a set of advisers, including Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and his own choice for secretary of state, James F. Byrnes. This group tended to take a harder line toward Moscow than had Roosevelt. (Schmitz) Administration officials favoring cooperation with the Soviet Union and incorporation of socialist economies into a world trade system were marginalized.

One week after the Potsdam Conference ended, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki added to Soviet distrust of the United States. Shortly following the attacks, Stalin protested to U.S. officials when Truman offered the Soviets little real influence in occupied Japan. (LaFeber 2002, p. 28)

In February 1946, George F. Kennan's "Long Telegram" from Moscow helped articulate the growing hard line against the Soviets. (Schmitz) The telegram argued that the Soviet Union was motivated by both traditional Russian imperialism and Marxist ideology, and that Soviet behavior was inherently expansionist and paranoid, posing a threat to the United States and its allies. Later writing as "Mr. X" in his article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in Foreign Affairs (July 1947), Kennan drafted the classic argument for adopting a policy of "containment" toward the Soviet Union.

A few weeks after the release of the "Long Telegram," former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered his famous "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri. The speech called for an Anglo-American alliance against the Soviets, whom he accused of establishing an "iron curtain" from "Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic." (Schmitz)

On September 6, 1946 James F. Byrnes made a speech in Germany repudiating the Morgenthau Plan, as well as warning the Soviets that the U.S. intended to maintain a military presence in Europe indefinitely. (see Restatement of Policy on Germany) As Byrnes admitted a month later "The nub of our program was to win the German people . . . it was a battle between us and Russia over minds. . . "^[6]

Perang Dingin terbagi kedalam 5 era waktu :

1947–1953 | 1953–1962 | 1962–1979 | 1979–1991 | 1985–1991

Kejadian yang berhubungan dengan perang dingin

Peserta Perang Dingin

Artikel bertopik perang ini adalah sebuah rintisan. Anda dapat membantu Wikipedia dengan mengembangkannya.

^ The term "Wisconsin school" refers to interpretations of the Cold War influenced by William Appleman Williams, a historian at the University of Wisconsin. The term is used because his research interests were continued by some of his students, particularly Walter La Feber.
^ LeFaber 2002, pp. 1-2
^ Walter LaFeber, "Cold War." A Reader's Companion to American History, Eric Foner and John A. Garrraty, eds. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991.
^ David F. Schmitz, "Cold War (1945–91): Causes" The Oxford Companion to American Military History. John Whiteclay Chambers II, ed., Oxford University Press 1999.
^ Peter Byrd, "Cold War" The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics. Ed. Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan. Oxford University Press, 2003.
^ Curtis F. Morgan, Southern Partnership: James F. Byrnes, Lucius D. Clay and Germany, 1945 1947

[1] The term "Wisconsin school" refers to interpretations of the Cold War influenced by William Appleman Williams, a historian at the University of Wisconsin. The term is used because his research interests were continued by some of his students, particularly Walter La Feber.

[2] LeFaber 2002, pp. 1-2

[3] Walter LaFeber, "Cold War." A Reader's Companion to American History, Eric Foner and John A. Garrraty, eds. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991.

[4] David F. Schmitz, "Cold War (1945–91): Causes" The Oxford Companion to American Military History. John Whiteclay Chambers II, ed., Oxford University Press 1999.

[5] Peter Byrd, "Cold War" The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics. Ed. Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan. Oxford University Press, 2003.

[6] Curtis F. Morgan, Southern Partnership: James F. Byrnes, Lucius D. Clay and Germany, 1945 1947

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]