Aktivitas CIA di Afganistan

Sejak 1970-an, CIA telah terlibat dalam berbagai operasi di Afganistan. Operasi besar pertama, dengan kode nama Operasi Cyclone , dimulai pada 1979. Itu adalah program untuk mempersenjatai dan membiayai para pejuang mujahidin di Afganistan sebelum dan selama intervensi militer oleh Uni Soviet. Presiden Reagan telah melihat perluasan doktrin Reagan, yang membantu gerakan perlawanan anti-Soviet. Program tersebut juga mendukung kelompok-kelompok Islam militan yang disukai oleh rezim Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq di negara tetangga Pakistan, dengan mengorbankan kelompok-kelompok perlawanan lain yang juga telah memerangi Republik Demokratik Afganistan yang berorientasi pada Marxis.^[1] Operation Cyclone adalah salah satu operasi rahasia CIA terpanjang dan termahal yang pernah dilakukan;^[2] memakan biaya lebih dari $20–$30 juta per tahun pada 1980, dan meningkat menjadi $630 juta per tahun pada 1987.^[1]^[3]^[4]^[5] Pendanaan berlanjut setelah tahun 1989 saat para mujahidin bertempur melawan pasukan PDPA Mohammad Najibullah selama Perang saudara di Afganistan (1989–1992).^[6] Setelah penarikan pasukan Soviet, tujuan CIA adalah untuk menjatuhkan pemerintahan Mohammad Najibullah, yang telah dibentuk di bawah pendudukan Soviet. Tiga faksi utama yang didukung CIA adalah: Ahmed Shah Massoud, Gulbadin Hekmatyar, dan Jalaluddin Haqqani. Perang saudara lainnya berkembang pada tahun 1990, ketika Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) dan Gulbadin Hekmatyar yang didukung CIA berusaha dengan keras untuk menghilangkan semua saingan, termasuk Ahmed Shah Massoud. Terlepas dari perang internal ini, ISI dan CIA merumuskan rencana untuk menggulingkan pemerintah Najibullah dalam serangan musim dingin di Kabul. Sebagai bagian dari serangan ini, CIA membayar Massoud $500,000, melebihi gaji bulanannya sebesar $200,000, untuk menutup Salang Highway, yang gagal dilakukan Massoud. Selama periode ini, AS menjadi semakin khawatir dengan hubungan antara Pakistan dan Taliban. Dukungan mereka terhadap Taliban meningkatkan ketegangan antara AS dan Pakistan. Ini mengkhawatirkan bagi AS karena Taliban tumbuh menjadi ancaman yang lebih ekstrem dan langsung bagi Amerika Serikat, warganya, dan pejabat asingnya.

Referensi

^ ^a ^b Bergen, Peter, Holy War Inc., Free Press, (2001), p.68
^ Barlett, Donald L.; Steele, James B. (13 May 2003). "The Oily Americans". Time. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 2018-12-24. Diakses tanggal 2008-07-08. Diarsipkan 2018-12-24 di Wayback Machine.
^ Riedel, Bruce (2014). What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Brookings Institution Press. hlm. ix–xi, 21–22, 93, 98–99, 105. ISBN 978-0815725954.
^ Gates, Bob (2007). From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. Simon and Schuster. hlm. 145–147. ISBN 9781416543367. When asked whether he expected that the revelations in his memoir (combined with an apocryphal quote attributed to Brzezinski) would inspire "a mind-bending number of conspiracy theories which adamantly—and wrongly—accuse the Carter Administration of luring the Soviets into Afghanistan," Gates replied: "No, because there was no basis in fact for an allegation the administration tried to draw the Soviets into Afghanistan militarily." See Gates, email communication with John Bernell White, Jr., October 15, 2011, as cited in White, John Bernell (May 2012). "The Strategic Mind Of Zbigniew Brzezinski: How A Native Pole Used Afghanistan To Protect His Homeland" (PDF). hlm. 45–46, 82. Diarsipkan dari versi asli (PDF) tanggal 2016-03-04. Diakses tanggal 2016-09-11.
^ Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 . Penguin. hlm. 87, 581. ISBN 9781594200076. Contemporary memos—particularly those written in the first days after the Soviet invasion—make clear that while Brzezinski was determined to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan through covert action, he was also very worried the Soviets would prevail. ... Given this evidence and the enormous political and security costs that the invasion imposed on the Carter administration, any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan warrants deep skepticism.
^ Crile, p 519 & elsewhere

[bergen68-1] Bergen, Peter, Holy War Inc., Free Press, (2001), p.68

[Oily-2] Barlett, Donald L.; Steele, James B. (13 May 2003). "The Oily Americans". Time. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 2018-12-24. Diakses tanggal 2008-07-08. Diarsipkan 2018-12-24 di Wayback Machine.

[Riedel-3] Riedel, Bruce (2014). What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Brookings Institution Press. hlm. ix–xi, 21–22, 93, 98–99, 105. ISBN 978-0815725954.

[Gates-4] Gates, Bob (2007). From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. Simon and Schuster. hlm. 145–147. ISBN 9781416543367. When asked whether he expected that the revelations in his memoir (combined with an apocryphal quote attributed to Brzezinski) would inspire "a mind-bending number of conspiracy theories which adamantly—and wrongly—accuse the Carter Administration of luring the Soviets into Afghanistan," Gates replied: "No, because there was no basis in fact for an allegation the administration tried to draw the Soviets into Afghanistan militarily." See Gates, email communication with John Bernell White, Jr., October 15, 2011, as cited in White, John Bernell (May 2012). "The Strategic Mind Of Zbigniew Brzezinski: How A Native Pole Used Afghanistan To Protect His Homeland" (PDF). hlm. 45–46, 82. Diarsipkan dari versi asli (PDF) tanggal 2016-03-04. Diakses tanggal 2016-09-11.

[Coll-5] Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 . Penguin. hlm. 87, 581. ISBN 9781594200076. Contemporary memos—particularly those written in the first days after the Soviet invasion—make clear that while Brzezinski was determined to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan through covert action, he was also very worried the Soviets would prevail. ... Given this evidence and the enormous political and security costs that the invasion imposed on the Carter administration, any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan warrants deep skepticism.

[6] Crile, p 519 & elsewhere

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