Arthur Schopenhauer: Perbedaan antara revisi
Konten dihapus Konten ditambahkan
Baris 235:
{{Blockquote|"Saya ingat pernah membaca orang Inggris, ketika berburu di India, ia menembak seekor monyet; Ia tidak bisa melupakan tatapan wajah yang diberikan oleh hewan sekarat itu, dan sejak itu, dia tidak pernah lagi menembak monyet."|''On the Basis of Morality'', § 19}}
{{Blockquote|"[[Sir William Harris]] describes how he shot his first elephant, a female. The next morning he went to look for the dead animal; all the other elephants had fled from the neighborhood except a young one, who had spent the night with its dead mother. Forgetting all fear, he came toward the sportsmen with the clearest and liveliest evidence of inconsolable grief, and put his tiny trunk round them in order to appeal to them for help. Harris says he was then filled with real remorse for what he had done, and felt as if he had committed a murder."|''On the Basis of Morality'', § 19}}
Schopenhauer sangat mengasihi anjing-anjing pudel peliharaannya. Ia mengkritik pandangan [[Baruch de Spinoza|Spinoza]]<ref>"His contempt for animals, who, as mere things for our use, are declared by him to be without rights, ... in conjunction with Pantheism, is at the same time absurd and abominable." ''The World as Will and Representation'', Vol. 2, Chapter 50.</ref> bahwa hewan hanyalah sarana yang digunakan untuk kepuasan manusia.<ref>Spinoza, ''Ethics'', Pt. IV, Prop. XXXVII, Note I.: "Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in a way which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours ..." This is the exact opposite of Schopenhauer's doctrine. Also, ''Ethics'', Appendix, 26, "whatsoever there be in nature beside man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capacities, and to adapt to our use as best we may."</ref><ref>"Such are the matters which I engage to prove in Prop. xviii of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow-men, but not with beasts, or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us. Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men. Still I affirm that beasts feel. But I also affirm that we may consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions." ''Ethics'', Part 4, Prop. 37, Note 1.</ref>
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