Konflik Chad-Libya: Perbedaan antara revisi

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Baris 102:
Kepentingan oposisi yang ditemui menyebabkan Gaddafi dan Goukouni untuk berbicara tentang kepentingan dari hal ini, berbicara tentang persatuan rakyat, dan bukan negara, dan sebagai jalan pertama menuju kolaborasi yang lebih dekat, tetapi kerusakan telah dilakukan, dan dengan buruk melemahkan wibawa Goukouni sebagai nasionalis dan negarawan.<ref name=Azevedo147/>
 
IncreasingMeningkatnya internationaltekanan pressuresinternasional againstatas Libyankehadiran presenceLibya indi Chad, were atpada firstawalnya metditemui byoleh Goukouni's statingyang thatmenyatakan thebahwa LibyansLibya wereada present indi Chad because requestedkarena bydiminta theoleh governmentpemerintah, anddan internationalmediator mediatorsinternasional shuldharus simplymenerima acceptkeputusan the decision ofpemerintah Chad's legitimate government. InDalam apertemuan meetingyang helddilakukan inbulan May Goukouni had became more accommodatingMei, declaringGokouni thatmenyatakan whilebahwa thesementara Libyankemunduran forcespasukan withdrawalLibya wasbukan not a priorityprioritas, he would accept theia decisionsakan ofmenerima thekeputusan OAU. Goukouni couldhampir hardlytidak atmelakukan thedalam momentbeberapa renouncewaktu tomeninggalkan Libyankepada militarybantuan supportmiliter Libya, thatyang dealtdijanjikan withdengan FAN Habré's FAN, alwaysselalu supporteddidukung byoleh Egypt[[Mesir]] anddan [[Sudan, and]] fundeddan throughdidanai Egyptmelalui byMesir theoleh [[CIA]].<ref>S. Nolutshungu, p. 156</ref>
 
In the meantime relations between Goukouni and Gaddafi started deteriorating. Libyan troops were stationed in various ponts of northern and central Chad, in numbers that had reached by January&ndash;February about 14,000 troops. The Libyan forces in the country created considerable annoyance in the GUNT, by supporting Acyl's faction in its disputes with the other militias, including the clashes held in late April with Goukouni's Angkatan Bersenjata Rakyat. There were also attempts to Libyanize the local population, that made many conclude that "unification" for Libya meant Arabization and the imposition of Libyan political culture, in particular of [[the Green Book]].<ref>S. Nolutshungu, p. 153</ref><ref name=Brecher90>M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 90</ref><ref name=Azevedo148>M. Azevedo, p. 148</ref>
Baris 108:
Amid fighting in October between Gaddafi's Islamic Legionnaires and Goukouni's troops, and rumors that Acyl was planning a coup d'état to assume the leadership of the GUNT, Goukouni demanded on [[October 29]] the complete and unequivocal withdrawal of Libyan forces from Chadian territory, which, beginning with the capital, was to be completed by [[December 31]]. The Libyans were to be replaced by an [[OAU]] [[Inter-African Force]] (IAF). Gaddafi complied, and by [[November 16]] all Libyan forces had left Chad, redeploying in the Aouzou Strip.<ref name=Azevedo148/><ref name=Brecher90/>
 
Libya's prompt retreat took many observers by surprise. Reasons were to be found in Gaddafi's desire to host the OAU's a
Libya's prompt retreat took many observers by surprise. Reasons were to be found in Gaddafi's desire to host the OAU's annual conference in 1982 and assume the presidency of the for that year. Another point could be found in Libya's difficult situation in Chad, where without some popular and international acceptance for Libyan presence it would have been difficult to take the concrete risk of causing a war with Egypt and Sudan, with US support. This does not mean that Gaddafi had renounced the goals he had set for Chad, but that he now had to search for somebody else as Chad's leader, as Goukouni had proved himself unreliable.<ref name=Azevedo148/><ref>S. Nolutshungu, pp. 154&ndash;155</ref>
 
=== Habré takes N'Djamena ===