Arthur Schopenhauer: Perbedaan antara revisi
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Baris 236:
{{Blockquote|"Saya ingat pernah membaca tulisan orang Inggris, ketika berburu di India, ia menembak seekor monyet; Ia tidak bisa melupakan tatapan wajah yang diberikan oleh hewan sekarat itu, dan sejak itu, dia tidak pernah lagi menembak monyet."|''On the Basis of Morality'', § 19}}
{{Blockquote|"Tuan William Harris menceritakan bagaimana ia menembak gajah pertamanya, seekor gajah betina. Keesokan paginya, ia pergi mencari hewan yang mati itu; ketika semua gajah lainnya telah melarikan diri dari lingkungan sekitar [karena ketakutan], seekor gajah kecil tetap tinggal bersama gajah induknya yang telah mati. Melawan semua rasa takutnya, gajah kecil itu kemudian mendatangi para pemburu itu dengan kesedihan yang mendalam, dan meletakkan belalai kecilnya pada mereka, seolah-olah untuk memohon bantuan. Harris mengatakan bahwa ia kemudian sangat menyesal atas perbuatannya, dan merasa seakan-akan
Schopenhauer sangat mengasihi anjing-anjing pudel peliharaannya. Ia mengkritik pandangan [[Baruch de Spinoza|Spinoza]]<ref>"His contempt for animals, who, as mere things for our use, are declared by him to be without rights, ... in conjunction with Pantheism, is at the same time absurd and abominable." ''The World as Will and Representation'', Vol. 2, Chapter 50.</ref> bahwa hewan hanyalah sarana yang digunakan untuk kepuasan manusia.<ref>Spinoza, ''Ethics'', Pt. IV, Prop. XXXVII, Note I.: "Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in a way which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours ..." This is the exact opposite of Schopenhauer's doctrine. Also, ''Ethics'', Appendix, 26, "whatsoever there be in nature beside man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capacities, and to adapt to our use as best we may."</ref><ref>"Such are the matters which I engage to prove in Prop. xviii of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow-men, but not with beasts, or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us. Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men. Still I affirm that beasts feel. But I also affirm that we may consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions." ''Ethics'', Part 4, Prop. 37, Note 1.</ref>
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