Arthur Schopenhauer: Perbedaan antara revisi

{{Blockquote|Asumsi bahwa hewan tidak mempunyai hak dan ilusi bahwa perlakuan kita terhadap mereka tidak memiliki signifikansi moral adalah contoh dari keburukan dan kebiadaban peradaban Barat. Belas kasih universal adalah satu-satunya dasar moralitas.|''On the Basis of Morality'', chapter 8<ref>Quoted in {{cite book | last = Ryder | first = Richard | title = Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism | publisher = Berg Publishers | location = Oxford | year = 2000 |isbn=978-1-85973-330-1 |page=57}}</ref>}}Pada tahun 1841, ia memuji pendirian [[RSPCA|''Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals'']] di London dan ''Animals' Friends Society'' di Philadelphia. Schopenhauer juga memprotes penggunaan kata ganti "''it''" (dalam bahasa Inggris) untuk merujuk pada hewan karena hal itu menyebabkan hewan diperlakukan seolah-olah mereka tidak mempunyai kehidupan.<ref>"... in English all animals are of the neuter gender and so are represented by the pronoun 'it,' just as if they were inanimate things. The effect of this artifice is quite revolting, especially in the case of primates, such as dogs, monkeys, and the like...." ''On the Basis of Morality'', § 19.</ref> Untuk memperkuat argumennya, Schopenhauer merujuk pada laporan anekdotal tentang tatapan mata seekor monyet yang ditembak dan juga kesedihan seekor anak gajah yang ibunya mati dibunuh oleh seorang pemburu.

 

 

 

Schopenhauer sangat mengasihi anjing-anjing pudel peliharaannya. Ia mengkritik pandangan [[Baruch de Spinoza|Spinoza]]<ref>"His contempt for animals, who, as mere things for our use, are declared by him to be without rights, ... in conjunction with Pantheism, is at the same time absurd and abominable." ''The World as Will and Representation'', Vol. 2, Chapter 50.</ref> bahwa hewan hanyalah sarana yang digunakan untuk kepuasan manusia.<ref>Spinoza, ''Ethics'', Pt. IV, Prop. XXXVII, Note I.: "Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in a way which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours&nbsp;..." This is the exact opposite of Schopenhauer's doctrine. Also, ''Ethics'', Appendix, 26, "whatsoever there be in nature beside man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capacities, and to adapt to our use as best we may."</ref><ref>"Such are the matters which I engage to prove in Prop. xviii of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow-men, but not with beasts, or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us. Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men. Still I affirm that beasts feel. But I also affirm that we may consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions." ''Ethics'', Part 4, Prop. 37, Note 1.</ref>