Emotivisme

Emotivisme adalah pandangan meta-etika yang mengklaim bahwa kalimat etis tidak menyampaikan proposisi, melainkan sikap emosional.^[1]^[2] Karena itu teori ini dikenal dengan sebutan teori hore/huu. Dipengaruhi oleh pertumbuhan filsafat analitis dan positivisme logika pada abad ke-20, teori ini dijelaskan oleh A. J. Ayer dalam buku Language, Truth and Logic (1936),^[3] tetapi lebih dikembangkan oleh C. L. Stevenson.^[4]

Emotivisme dapat dianggap sebagai bentuk non-kognitivisme atau ekspresivisme. Emotivisme menolak bentuk-bentuk lain non-kognitivisme (seperti kuasi-realisme dan preskriptivisme universal) serta segala bentuk kognitivisme (termasukk= realisme moral dan subjektivisme etika).

Pada tahun 1950-an, emotivisme tampil dalam bentuk modifikasi dari preskriptivisme universal R. M. Hare.^[5]^[6]

Lihat pula

Catatan kaki

^ Garner and Rosen, Moral Philosophy, chapter 13 ("Noncognitivist Theories") and Brandt, Ethical Theory, chapter 9 ("Noncognitivism") regard the ethical theories of Ayer, Stevenson and Hare as noncognitivist ones.
^ Ogden and Richards, Meaning, 125: "'Good' is alleged to stand for a unique, unanalyzable concept … [which] is the subject matter of ethics. This peculiar ethical use of 'good' is, we suggest, a purely emotive use. … Thus, when we so use it in the sentence, 'This is good,' we merely refer to this, and the addition of "is good" makes no difference whatever to our reference … it serves only as an emotive sign expressing our attitude to this, and perhaps evoking similar attitudes in other persons, or inciting them to actions of one kind or another." This quote appears in an extended form just before the preface of Stevenson's Ethics and Language.
^ Pepper, Ethics, 277: "[Emotivism] was stated in its simplest and most striking form by A. J. Ayer."
^ Brandt, Ethical Theory, 239, calls Stevenson's Ethics and Language "the most important statement of the emotive theory", and Pepper, Ethics, 288, says it "was the first really systematic development of the value judgment theory and will probably go down in the history of ethics as the most representative for this school."
^ Brandt, Ethical Theory, 221: "A recent book [The Language of Morals] by R. M. Hare has proposed a view, otherwise very similar to the emotive theory, with modifications …"
^ Wilks, Emotion, 79: "… while Hare was, no doubt, a critic of the [emotive theory], he was, in the eyes of his own critics, a kind of emotivist himself. His theory, as a consequence, has sometimes been depicted as a reaction against emotivism and at other times as an extension of it."

Referensi

Ayer, A. J. (1952) [1936]. "Critique of Ethics and Theology". Language, Truth and Logic. New York: Dover Publications. ISBN 0-486-20010-8. LCCN 52000860.
Berkeley, George (1710). Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.
Brandt, Richard (1959). "Noncognitivism: The Job of Ethical Sentences Is Not to State Facts". Ethical Theory. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. LCCN 59010075.
Garner, Richard T.; Bernard Rosen (1967). Moral Philosophy: A Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics. New York: Macmillan. LCCN 67018887.
Hare, R. M. (1952). The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hudson, W. D. (1970). Modern Moral Philosophy. Macmillan and Co. Ltd.
Hume, David (1751). An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.
Moore, G. E. (2005) [1912]. "Editor's Introduction". Dalam William Shaw. Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ISBN 0-19-927201-8.
Ogden, C. K.; I. A. Richards (1946) [1923]. The Meaning of Meaning. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
Pepper, Stephen C. (1960). Ethics. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. LCCN 60006796.
Ross, David (1939). Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Satris, Stephen (1987). Ethical Emotivism. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. ISBN 90-247-3413-4.
Seanor, Douglas; Fotion, D.; Hare, R. M. (1988). Hare and Critics. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-824780-X.
Stevenson, C. L. (1937). "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms". Dalam Stevenson, C. L. Facts and Values. Yale University Press (dipublikasikan tanggal 1963). ISBN 0-8371-8212-3.
Stevenson, C. L. (1944). Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press. OCLC 5184534.
Urmson, J. O. (1968). The Emotive Theory of Ethics. London: Hutchinson University Library. ISBN 0-09-087430-7.
Wilks, Colin (2002). Emotion, Truth and Meaning. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. ISBN 1-4020-0916-X.

Pranala luar

(Inggris) Entri Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism di Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Emotivism, Intuitionism and Prescriptivism A clear explanation
Emotivism definition in philosophyprofessor.com

[1] Garner and Rosen, Moral Philosophy, chapter 13 ("Noncognitivist Theories") and Brandt, Ethical Theory, chapter 9 ("Noncognitivism") regard the ethical theories of Ayer, Stevenson and Hare as noncognitivist ones.

[2] Ogden and Richards, Meaning, 125: "'Good' is alleged to stand for a unique, unanalyzable concept … [which] is the subject matter of ethics. This peculiar ethical use of 'good' is, we suggest, a purely emotive use. … Thus, when we so use it in the sentence, 'This is good,' we merely refer to this, and the addition of "is good" makes no difference whatever to our reference … it serves only as an emotive sign expressing our attitude to this, and perhaps evoking similar attitudes in other persons, or inciting them to actions of one kind or another." This quote appears in an extended form just before the preface of Stevenson's Ethics and Language.

[3] Pepper, Ethics, 277: "[Emotivism] was stated in its simplest and most striking form by A. J. Ayer."

[4] Brandt, Ethical Theory, 239, calls Stevenson's Ethics and Language "the most important statement of the emotive theory", and Pepper, Ethics, 288, says it "was the first really systematic development of the value judgment theory and will probably go down in the history of ethics as the most representative for this school."

[5] Brandt, Ethical Theory, 221: "A recent book [The Language of Morals] by R. M. Hare has proposed a view, otherwise very similar to the emotive theory, with modifications …"

[6] Wilks, Emotion, 79: "… while Hare was, no doubt, a critic of the [emotive theory], he was, in the eyes of his own critics, a kind of emotivist himself. His theory, as a consequence, has sometimes been depicted as a reaction against emotivism and at other times as an extension of it."

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