Martin Heidegger

filsuf Jerman
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Martin Heidegger (26 September 1889 – 26 Mei 1976) adalah seorang filsuf asal Jerman. Ia belajar di Universitas Freiburg di bawah Edmund Husserl, penggagas fenomenologi, dan kemudian menjadi profesor di sana 1928. Ia memengaruhi banyak filsuf lainnya, dan murid-muridnya termasuk Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hans Jonas, Emmanuel Levinas, Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Xavier Zubiri dan Karl Löwith. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jean-Luc Nancy, dan Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe juga mempelajari tulisan-tulisannya dengan mendalam. Selain hubungannya dengan fenomenologi, Heidegger dianggap mempunyai pengaruh yang besar atau tidak dapat diabaikan terhadap eksistensialisme, dekonstruksi, hermeneutika dan pasca-modernisme. Ia berusaha mengalihkan filsafat Barat dari pertanyaan-pertanyaan metafisis dan epistemologis ke arah pertanyaan-pertanyaan ontologis, artinya, pertanyaan-pertanyaan menyangkut makna keberadaan, atau apa artinya bagi manusia untuk berada. Heidegger juga merupakan anggota akademik yang penting dari Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei.

Martin Heidegger
LahirSeptember 26, 1889
Meßkirch, Germany
Meninggal26 Mei 1976(1976-05-26) (umur 86)
Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany
EraFilsuf abad ke-20
KawasanFilosofi Barat
AliranPhenomenology · Hermeneutics · Existentialism
Minat utama
Ontology · Metaphysics · Art · Greek philosophy · Technology · Language · Poetry  · Thinking
Gagasan penting
Dasein · Gestell · Heideggerian terminology
Dipengaruhi
Memengaruhi


The Mesmerhaus di Meßkirch, tempat Heidegger tumbuh
Makam Heidegger

Masa kecil dan pendidikan

Heidegger dilahirkan di sebuah keluarga desa di Meßkirch, Jerman, dan diharapkan kelak menjadi seorang pendeta. Di masa remajanya, ia dipengaruhi oleh Aristoteles yang dikenalnya lewat teologi Kristen. Konsep tentang Ada, dalam pengertian tradisional ini, yang berasal dari Plato, adalah perkenalan pertamanya dengan sebuah gagasan yang kelak ditanamkannya pada pusaat karyanya yang paling terkenal, Being and Time (bahasa Jerman: Sein und Zeit) (1927). Keluarganya tidak cukup kaya untuk mengirimnya ke universitas, dan ia membutuhkan bea siswa. Untuk maksud tersebut, ia harus belajar agama. Heidegger juga tertarik akan matematika. Ketika ia belajar sebagai mahasiswa, ia meninggalkan teologi dan beralih kepada filsafat, karena ia menemukan sumber pendanaan lain untuk studinya. Ia menulis disertasi doktoralnya berdasarkan sebuah teks yang saat itu dianggap sebagai karya Duns Scotus, seorang pemikir etika dan keagamaan abad ke-14, namun belakangan orang menduga itu adalah karya Thomas dari Erfurt.

Heidegger mulanya adalah seorang pengikutfenomenologi. Secara sederhana, kaum fenomenolog menghampiri filsafat dengan berusaha memahami pengalaman tanpa diperantarai oleh pengetahuan sebelumnya dan asumsi-asumsi teoretis abstrak. Edmund Husserl adalah pendiri dan tokoh utama aliran ini, sementara Heidegger adalah mahasiswanya dan hal inilah yang meyakinkan Heidegger untuk menjadi seorang fenomenolog. Heidegger menjadi tertarik akan pertanyaan tentang "Ada" (atau apa artinya "berada"). Karyanya yang terkenal Being and Time (Ada dan Waktu) dicirikan sebagai sebuah ontologi fenomenologis. Gagasan tentang Ada berasal dari Parmenides dan secara tradisional merupakan salah satu pemikiran utama dari filsafat Barat. Persoalan tentang keberadaan dihidupkan kembali oleh Heidegger setelah memudar karena pengaruh tradisi metafisika dariPlato hingga Descartes, dan belakangan ini pada Masa Pencerahan. Heidegger berusaha mendasarkan Ada di dalam waktu, dan dengan demikian menemukan hakikat atau makna yang sesungguhnya dalam artian kemampuannya untuk kita pahami.

Demikianlah Heidegger memulai di mana Ada itu dimulai, yakni di dalam filsafat Yunani, membangkitkan kembali suatu masalah yang telah lenyap dan yang kurang dihargai dalam filsafat masa kini. Upaya besar Heidegger adalah menangani kembali gagasan Plato dengan serius, dan pada saat yang sama menggoyahkan seluruh dunia Platonis dengan menantang saripati Platonisme - memperlakukan Ada bukan sebagai sesuatu yang nirwaktu dan transenden, melainkan sebagai yang imanen (selalu hadir) dalam waktu dan sejarah. Hal ini yang mengakibatkan kaum Platonis seperti George Grant menghargai kecemerlangan Heidegger sebagai seorang pemikir meskipun mereka tidak setuju dengan analisisnya tentang Ada dan konsepsinya tentang gagasan Platoniknya.

Meskipun Heidegger adalah seorang pemikir yang luar biasa kreatif dan asli, dia juga meminjam banyak dari pemikiran Friedrich Nietzsche dan Soren Kierkegaard. Heidegger dapat dibandingkan dengan Aristoteles yang menggunakan dialog Plato dan secara sistematis menghadirkannya sebagai satu bentuk gagasan. Bagitu juga Heidegger mengambil intisari pemikiran Nietzsche dari sebuah fragmen yang tak terbit dan menafsirkannya sebagai bentuk puncak metafisika barat. Karya Heidegger berupa transkrip perkuliahan selama 1936 tentang Nietzsche’s Will to Power as Art kurang bernilai akademis dibandingkan karyanya sendiri yang lebih asli. Konsep Heidegger tentang kecemasan angst dan das sein berasal dari konsep Kierkegaard tentang kecemasan, pentingnya relasi subjektivitas dengan kebenaran, eksistensi di hadapan kematian, kesementaraan eksistensi, dan pentingnya afirmasi diri dari Ada seseorang di dalam dunia.

Martin Heidegger dianggap sebagai salah satu filsuf terbesar dari abad 20. Arti pentingnya hanya dapat disaingi oleh Ludwig Wittgenstein. Gagasannya merasuki berbagai bidang penelitian yang luas. Karena diskusi Heidegger tentang ontologi maka dia kerap dianggap salah satu pendiri eksistensialisme dan gagasannya kerap mewarnai banyak karya besar filsafat seperti karya Sartre yang mengadopsinya banyak gagasannya, meskipun Heidegger bersikeras bahwa Sartre salah memahami gagasannya. Gagasannya diterima di seluruh Jerman, Perancis, dan Jepang hingga banyak pengikut di Amerka Utara sejak 1970-an. Meskipun demikian, gagasannya dianggap sebagai tak bernilai oleh beberapa pemikir kontemporer seperti mereka yang di dalam Lingkaran Wina,Theodor Adorno, dan filsuf Inggris Bertrand Russell dan Alfred Ayer.

Penolakan Heidegger akan konsep seperti pembedaan fakta dan nilai, penambahan komponen etis pada filsafatnya, kekritisannya terhadap sains dan teknologi modern, dan klaimnya akan kesalahpahaman akan pikirannya kerap membingungkan para filsuf. Serangan terhadap gagasannya nampak menjadi satu-satunya kemungkinan yang dapat dilakukan, terlebih ditambah dengan tingkah laku pribadinya yang tampak secara moral dan politik ambigu.

Philosophy

Being and Time

Karya terpenting Heidegger adalah Being and Time (German Sein und Zeit, 1927). Meskipun karya yang terbit hanyalah sepertiga dari total rencana keseluruhan sebagaimana tampak dalam pengantarnya namun karya ini menunjukkan satu titik balik dalam filsafat kontinental. Karya ini berpengaruh besar dan luas serta masih menjadi salah satu karya yang paling banyak dibicarakan pada abad ke-20. Banyak paham filsafat, seperti eksistensialisme dan dekonstruksi, yang berhutang banyak pada Being and Time.

Dalam karya ini, Heidegger memepertanyakan makna dari ada: apa maknanya bila sesuatu entitas dikatakan ada? Pertanyaan ini adalah satu pertanyaan mendasar dalam caakupan wilayah ontologi. Dalam pendekatannya Heidegger terpisah dari tradisi Aristotelian dan Kantian yang mendekati pertanyaan itu dari sudut pandang logika. Secara implisit mereka mengatakan bahwa pengetahuan teoritis mewakili relasi mendasar antara individu dan ada di dunia sekitarnya (mencakup juga dirinya sendiri).

Heidegger menolak tesis ini dengan mengawali pendekatannya dari fenomena keterlibatan yang disebutnya sebagai sorge. Perilaku manusia adalah sebuah keterlibatan secara aktif dengan objek keseharian di sekelilingnya. Dia bukan seorang pengamat pasif yang mengambil jarak dari dunianya. Pendaatnya ini sekaligus sebuah kritik bagi pemikiran Cartesian yang mengagungkan "aku" sebagai objek berpikir murni yang terpisah dari dunianya. Heidegger mengritik pernyataan terkenal Descartes aku berpikir maka aku ada yang terlalu menekankan pada aku berpikir dan lupa bahwa seharusnya aku ada terlebih dahulu barulah kemudian aku bisa berpikir. Fakta mendasar dari eksistensi manusia adalah bahwa kita telah 'ada di dalam dunia'. Dunia adalah karakter dari ada di dalam dunia, yang selanjutnya disebut dengan das sein.

Selanjutnya Heidegger menolak kategori subjek-ojek yang kerap dikenakan oleh filsuf pasca Descartes. Sesuatu bermakna bagi kita hanya dalam penggunaannya pada konteks tertentu yang telah ditetapkan oleh norma sosial.

However, all of these norms are radically contingent. Their contingency is revealed in the fundamental phenomenon of Angst, in which all norms fall away and beings show up as nothing in particular, in their essential meaninglessness. (Contrary to some existentialist interpretations of Heidegger, this does not mean that all existence is absurd; rather, it means that existence always has the potential for absurdity.) The experience of Angst reveals the essential finitude of human being.

The fact that beings can show up, either as meaningful in a context or as meaningless in the experience of Angst, depends on a prior phenomenon: that beings can show up at all. Heidegger calls the showing up of beings "truth", which he defines as unconcealment rather than correctness. This "truth of beings", their self-revelation, involves a more fundamental kind of truth, the "disclosure of being in which the being of beings is unconcealed." It is this unconcealment of being that defines human existence for Heidegger: the human being is that being for whom being is an issue, that is, for whom being shows up as such (Heidegger's word for such an entity, which could conceivably have non-human instantiations, is Da-sein). This is why Heidegger begins his inquiry into the meaning of being with an inquiry into the essence of human being; the ontology of Da-sein is fundamental ontology. The unconcealment of being is an essentially temporal and historical phenomenon (hence the "time" in Being and Time); what we call past, present, and future correspond originarily to aspects of this unconcealment and not to three mutually exclusive regions of the homogeneous time that clocks measure (although clock-time is derivative from the originary time of unconcealment, as Heidegger attempts to show in the book's difficult final chapters).

The total understanding of being results from an explication of the implicit knowledge of being that inheres in all human behavior. Philosophy thus becomes a form of interpretation; this is why Heidegger's technique in Being and Time is often referred to as hermeneutical phenomenology. Being and Time, being incomplete, contains Heidegger's statement of this project and his interpretation of human existence and its temporal horizon, but does not contain the working out of the meaning of being as such on the basis of this interpretation. This ambitious task is taken up in a different way in his later works (see below).

As part of his ontological project, Heidegger undertakes a reinterpretation of previous Western philosophy. He wants to explain why and how theoretical knowledge came to seem like the most fundamental relation to being. This explanation takes the form of a destructuring (Destruktion) of the philosophical tradition, an interpretive strategy that reveals the fundamental experience of being at the base of previous philosophies. In Being and Time he briefly destructures the philosophy of Descartes; in later works he uses this approach to interpret the philosophies of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Plato, among others. This technique exerted a profound influence on Derrida's deconstructive approach, although there are very important differences between the two methods.

Being and Time is the towering achievement of Heidegger's early career, but there are other important works from this period, including Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 1927), Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 1929), and "Was ist Metaphysik?" ("What Is Metaphysics?", 1929).

Later works

Although Heidegger claimed that all of his writings concerned a single question, the question of being, in the years after the publication of Being and Time the focus of his work gradually changed. This change is often referred to as Heidegger's Kehre (turn). In his later works, Heidegger turns from "doing" to "dwelling." He focuses less on the way in which the structures of being are revealed in everyday behavior and in the experience of Angst, and more on the way in which behavior itself depends on a prior "openness to being." The essence of being human is the maintenance of this openness. (The difference between Heidegger's early and late works is more a difference of emphasis than a radical break like that between the early and late works of Wittgenstein, but it is important enough to justify a division of the Heideggerian corpus into "early" (roughly, pre-1930) and "late" writings.)

Heidegger opposes this openness to the "will to power" of the modern human subject, who subordinates beings to his own ends rather than letting them "be what they are." Heidegger interprets the history of western philosophy as a brief period of authentic openness to being in the time of the pre-Socratics, especially Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Anaximander, followed by a long period increasingly dominated by nihilistic subjectivity, initiated by Plato and culminating in Nietzsche.

In the later writings, two recurring themes are poetry and technology. Heidegger sees poetry as a preeminent way in which beings are revealed "in their being." The play of poetic language (which is, for Heidegger, the essence of language itself) reveals the play of presence and absence that is being itself. Heidegger focuses especially on the poetry of Hölderlin.

Against the revealing power of poetry, Heidegger sets the force of technology. The essence of technology is the conversion of the whole universe of beings into an undifferentiated "standing reserve" (Bestand) of energy available for any use to which humans choose to put it. The standing reserve represents the most extreme nihilism, since the being of beings is totally subordinated to the will of the human subject. Heidegger does not unequivocally condemn technology; he believes that its increasing dominance might make it possible for humanity to return to its authentic task of the stewardship of being. Nevertheless, many of Heidegger's later works are characterized by an unmistakable agrarian nostalgia.

Heidegger's important later works include Vom Wesen der Wahrheit ("On the Essence of Truth," 1930), Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes ("The Origin of the Work of Art," 1935), Bauen Wohnen Denken ("Building Dwelling Thinking," 1951), and Die Frage nach der Technik ("The Question Concerning Technology," 1953) and Was heisst Denken? ("What Is Called Thinking?" 1954).

Influences and difficulties of French reception

Heidegger, like Husserl, is an explicitly acknowledged influence on existentialism, despite his explicit disavowal and objection, in texts such as the "Letter on Humanism," of the importation of key elements of his work into existentialist contexts. While Heidegger was banned from university teaching for a period shortly after the war on account of his activities as Rector of Freiburg, he developed a number of contacts in France who continued to teach his work and brought their students to visit him in Todtnauberg (see, for example, Jean-François Lyotard's brief account in "Heidegger and 'the jews': A Conference in Vienna and Freiburg," which discusses a Franco-German conference held in Freiburg in 1947, a first step in bringing together French and German students after the War). Heidegger subsequently made efforts to keep abreast of developments in French philosophy by way of recommendations from Jean Beaufret, who was an early French translator, and Lucien Braun.

Deconstruction as it is generally understood (i.e., as French and Anglo-American phenomena profoundly rooted in Heidegger's work, with limited general exposure in a German context until the 1980s) came to Heidegger's attention in 1967 by way of Lucien Braun's recommendation of Jacques Derrida's work (Hans-Georg Gadamer was present at an initial discussion and indicated to Heidegger that Derrida's work came to his attention by way of an assistant). Heidegger expressed interest in meeting Derrida personally after the latter sent him some of his work. (There was discussion of a meeting in 1972, but this did not happen.) Heidegger's interest in Derrida is said by Braun to have been considerable (as is evident in two letters, of 29 September 1967 and 16 May 1972, from Heidegger to Braun). Braun also brought to Heidegger's attention the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault's relation to Heidegger is a matter of considerable difficulty; Foucault acknowledged Heidegger as the philosopher whom he read but never wrote about. (For more on this see Penser à Strasbourg, Jacques Derrida, et al, which includes reproductions of both letters and an account by Braun, "À mi-chemin entre Heidegger et Derrida").

One feature that garnered initial interest in a French context (which propagated rather quickly to scholars of French literature and philosophy working in American universities) was Derrida's efforts to displace the understanding of Heidegger's work prevalent in France from the period of the ban against Heidegger teaching in German universities, which amounts in part to rejecting almost wholesale the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre and existentialist terms. In Derrida's view, deconstruction is a tradition inherited via Heidegger (the French term "déconstruction" is a translation of Heidegger's "Destruktion" - literally "destruction"), whereas Sartre's interpretation of Dasein and other key Heideggerian terms is overly psychologistic and (ironically) anthropocentric, consisting of a radical misconception of the limited number of Heidegger's texts commonly studied in France up to that point (namely Being and Time, What is Metaphysics?, and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics). Derrida, on the other hand, is at times presented as an ultra-orthodox "French Heidegger," to such an extent that he, his colleagues, and his former students are made to go proxy for Heidegger's worst (political) mistakes, despite ample evidence that the reception of Heidegger's work by later practitioners of deconstruction is anything but doctrinaire "Heideggerianism". The work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe may be taken as exemplary in this regard and was often commended as such by Derrida, who further contrasted Lacoue-Labarthe's extended work on Heidegger with Foucault's silence.

Having earlier mentioned the contributions of Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Lyotard to scholarship on Heidegger and National Socialism, it is worth noting that Heidegger's relation to the Holocaust and Nazism was the subject of great and occasionally fractious debate across various "deconstructions". These included the extent to which specific practitioners of deconstruction could entirely do without Heideggerian deconstruction (as Lyotard in particular may have wished) or were - rather - obliged to further (and in the cases of many mis- and uninformed criticisms, recall) already extensive criticisms of Heidegger which considerably predated (in the case of Derrida, by decades) the broad recognition of Heidegger's activities as a National Socialist. The latter were precipitated by press attention to the Victor Farias book "Heidegger et le nazisme" (Farias was an ex-student of Heidegger) and extensive treatments of the Holocaust and its implications. These included for example, the proceedings of the first conference dedicated to Derrida's work, published as "Les Fins de l'Homme" (the essay from which that title was taken), Derrida's "Feu la cendre/cio' che resta del fuoco", or the studies on Celan by Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida which shortly preceded the detailed studies of Heidegger's politics published in and after 1987.

Criticism

Heidegger's importance to the world of continental philosophy (which he largely created, there being no distinction between analytical and continental philosophy prior to him) is probably unsurpassed. His reception amongst philosophers of the analytic school, however, is quite another story. Saving a somewhat favorable review by Gilbert Ryle in the journal Mind of Being and Time at the time of its publication, Heidegger's contemporaries from the analytic tradition (which was still young, but already quite sharply delineated from other branches of philosophy) generally regarded both the content, insofar as they believed there to be any at all, and the style by which he delivered it, as evidence of the worst possible way of doing philosophy.

The analytic tradition values clarity of expression, whereas Heidegger thought that "making itself intelligible was suicide for philosophy." Apart from the charge of obscurantism, analytic philosophers generally considered the actual content that could be gleaned from Heidegger's work to be either trivially false, non-verifiable or uninteresting. This view has largely survived, and Heidegger is still spoken of with derision in most quarters of analytical philosophy, and his influence is considered to have been disastrous for philosophy, in that a clear line can be traced from it to most varieties of postmodern philosophical thinking.


Heidegger and Nazi Germany

Heidegger joined the Nazi Party on May 1, 1933, before being appointed the rector of the university in Freiburg. He resigned from the rectorship in April 1934. During this time Heidegger's former teacher Husserl, who was Jewish, was denied the use of the university library at Freiburg because of the racial cleansing laws issued by the Nazi Party. Heidegger also removed the dedication to Husserl from Being and Time when it was reissued in 1941. Heidegger later claimed that this was due to pressure from his publisher, Max Niemeyer. Additionally, when Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics (lectures originally given in 1935) was published in 1953, he declined to remove a reference to the "inner truth and greatness of this movement [die innere Wahrheit und Größe dieser Bewegnung]," i.e. National Socialism. Instead of deleting or altering the text, he merely added the parenthetical gloss, "(namely, the confrontation of planetary technology and modern humanity) (nämlich [die] Begegnung der planetarisch bestimmten Technik und des neuzeitlichen Menschen)." Many readers, notably Jürgen Habermas, came to interpret this ambiguous remark as evidence of his continued commitment to National Socialism.

Critics further cite Heidegger's affair with Hannah Arendt, when she was a doctoral student of his at the University of Marburg. This affair mostly went along in the 20s, some time before Heidegger's involvement in Nazism, but it did not end when she "fled" from him and moved to Heidelberg to continue with Karl Jaspers, and she later spoke on his behalf at his denazification hearings. Jaspers spoke against him at these same hearings, suggesting he would have a detrimental influence on young German students because of his powerful teaching presence. Arendt, who was Jewish, resumed their friendship, if extremely cautiously, after the war, despite or even because of the widespread contempt that Heidegger was held in for his political sympathies, and despite his being forbidden from teaching for a number of years.

Der Spiegel interview

Some years later, hoping to quiet controversy, Heidegger gave an interview to Der Spiegel magazine, in which he promised to discuss the issue provided it was published posthumously. It should also be mentioned that the published version was not a real interview, but the protocol had been largely "corrected" on Heidegger's demand. In this interview, Heidegger's defense of his Nazi involvement runs in two tracks: first, he argues that there would have been no alternative; he says he had tried to save the university (and science in general) from being politicized and had to make compromises with the Nazi administration. Second, he saw an "awakening" ("Aufbruch"), something which might help to find a "new national and social approach". From 1934 on, he says, he would have been more critical towards the government. Heidegger is evasive on some questions in this interview. For example, when he talks about a "national and social approach" in national socialism he links this to Friedrich Naumann. But Naumann's "national-sozialer Verein" was not at all national socialist, but liberal. This confusion seems to be deliberately created by Heidegger. Also, he changes between his two arguments quickly, disregarding their contradictions. And his statements often tend to take the form "others were much more Nazis than me" and "the Nazis did bad things to me, too", both of which are true, but miss the point. Also, the Der Spiegel interviewers did not bring to question Heidegger's quote from 1949 where he compares engineered food production to the Holocaust ("essentially the same"); in fact, they were not in possession of much of the evidence for Heidegger's sympathies towards Nazism which is known today. To further evaluate this issue, read "Only a God Can Save Us," Der Spiegel interview with Heidegger (1966) and Jürgen Habermas, "Work and Weltanschauung: The Heidegger Controversy from a German Perspective." translated by John McCumber, Critical Inquiry 15 (Winter 1989): pp. 431-456.

Obligations and unsplendid silence: Celan at "Todtnauberg"

Shortly after giving the Spiegel interview and following Celan's lecture at Freiburg, Heidegger hosted Paul Celan at his chalet at Todtnauberg. The two walked in the woods. Celan impressed Heidegger with his knowledge of botany (also evident in his poetry), and Heidegger is thought to have spoken about elements of his press interview. Celan signed Heidegger's guest book.

In his Poetry as Experience, Lacoue-Labarthe advanced the argument that, although Celan's poetry was deeply informed by Heidegger's philosophy, Celan was long aware of Heidegger's association with the Nazi party and therefore fundamentally circumspect toward the man and transformative in his reception of his work. Celan was nonetheless willing to meet Heidegger (although he may not have been willing to be photographed with him or to contribute to Festschriften honoring Heidegger's work). Heidegger was a professed admirer of Celan's writing, although he did not attend to it as Hölderlin or Trakl (neither did he attend to Celan as a Jewish poet working within that German tradition). "Todtnauberg", however, seems to hold out the unrealized possibility of a profound rapprochement between their work, albeit on the condition that Heidegger break a silence that virtually blanketed his work to the end (Lacoue-Labarthe has commented on the insufficiency of Heidegger's one known remark about the gas chambers, made in 1949). In this respect Heidegger's work was perhaps redeemable for Celan, even if that redemption or what need was had for it was never transacted between the two men. Lest one implicitly take this as Celan simply demanding an apology of Heidegger (such a scenario seems simplistic, the more so given that neither was given to simplism), there are reasonable grounds to argue that it was (and still is) at least as important to specify how the Nazi period is das Unheil (disaster, calamity) (which is to say: specificity as to a great deal more than counting the dead). What compelled Heidegger to write about poetry, technology, and truth ought to have compelled him to write about the German disaster, all the more so because, on the basis of his thought, Heidegger attributed an "inner greatness" to the movement that brought about that disaster.

Lacoue-Labarthe and Jacques Derrida have both commented extensively on Heidegger's corpus, and both have identified an idiomatically Heideggerian National Socialism that persisted until the end. It is perhaps of greater importance that Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida, following Celan to a degree, believed Heidegger to be also capable of a profound criticism of Nazism and the horrors it brought forth. They consider Heidegger's greatest failure not to be his involvement in the National Socialist movement but his "silence on the extermination" (Lacoue-Labarthe) and his refusal to engage in a thorough deconstruction of Nazism beyond laying out certain of his considerable objections to party orthodoxies and (particularly in the case of Lacoue-Labarthe) their passage through Nietzsche, Hölderlin, and Richard Wagner, all taken to be susceptible to Nazi appropriation. It would be reasonable to say that both Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida regarded Heidegger as capable of confronting Nazism in this more radical fashion and have themselves undertaken such work on the basis of this (one ought to note in due course the questions raised by Derrida in "Desistance" in calling attention to Lacoue-Labarthe's parenthetical comment: "(in any case, Heidegger never avoids anything)").

Conclusion

Heidegger's involvements with the Nazis and the lack of a clear apology for them complicated many of his friendships, and continues to complicate the reception of his work. It is disputable whether Heidegger was antisemitic or if he was taken in by the charismatic projections of Nazi propaganda, but he had clear sympathies for certain elements of Nazism. Whether this is in any way a result of his philosophy is still contested. It has also been noted that many parts of "Sein und Zeit" can be read as anti-democratic, anti-modernist and anti-liberal, e.g. the condemnations against the "lordship of the they" (Herrschaft des Man), the "chatter" (Gerede) and the Dasein's Verfallenheit (roughly, being-fallen-to) the world. However these critisims misunderstand Heidegger. Heidegger took pains to ensure that his use of terms like "Verfallenheit" were not interpreted as having negative implications. He states this explicitly in the opening paragraph of section 38 of "Being and Time".

The possibility that Heidegger's affiliation with the Nazi party was the result of his philosophy would lead many to discredit Heidegger as a philosopher solely on this basis, as Jean-François Lyotard remarked, the formula becomes "if a Nazi, then not a great thinker" or, conversely, "if a great thinker, then not a Nazi") -->

Karya

  • Sein und Zeit (1927)

"The most thought-provoking thing in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking."
-What is Called Thinking?

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