Pertempuran Maaten al-Sarra

Pertempuran Maaten al-Sarra adalah sebuah petempuran yang terjadi antara Chad dan Libya pada tanggal 5 September 1987 selama [[Perang Toyota]. Pertempuran ini merupakan serangan kejutan Chad atas Libya di lapangan udara Maaten al-Sarra untuk menghilangkan kekuatan udara Libya yang telah merintangi serangan Chad di Jalur Aouzou pada bulan Agustus. Pertempuran ini adalah satu-satunya pertempuran dimana dilakukan di teritori Libya selama konflik Chad-Libya.] Serangan ini berhasil dan menyebabkan jumlah kerugian Libya yang besar dan pendandatanganan gencatan senjata pada tanggal 11 September antara negara yang berperang.

Pertempuran Maaten al-Sarraa
Bagian dari Perang Toyota, Konflik Chad-Libya
Tanggal 5 September 1987 Lokasi Lapangan udara Maaten al-Sarra, Libya Hasil Kemenangan Chad
Pihak terlibat
Libya	Chad
Tokoh dan pemimpin
	Hassan Djamous
Kekuatan
2.500	2.000
Korban
1.000–1,713 killed 300 tahanan perang 70 tank 30 pengangkut personel lapis baja 26–32 pesawat tempur	65 terbunuh 112 wounded

|place=Maaten al-Sarra Air Base, Libya |result=Decisive Chadian victory |combatant1= Libya |combatant2= Chad |commander1=Uknown |commander2=Hassan Djamous |strength1=2,500 |strength2=2,000 |casualties1=1,000–1,713 killed
300 PoW
70 tanks
30 APCs
26–32 aircraft |casualties2=65 killed
112 wounded |notes= }}

The battle of Maaten al-Sarra was a battle fought between Chad and Libya on September 5 1987 during the Toyota War. The battle took the form of a surprise Chadian raid against the Libyan Maaten al-Sarra Air Base, meant to remove the threat of Libyan airpower, that had already thwarted the Chadian attack on the Aouzou Strip in August. The first clash ever held in Libyan territory since the beginning of the Chadian-Libyan conflict, the attack was fully successful, causing a high number of Libyan casualties and contributing to the definitive ceasefire signed on September 11 among the warring countries.

Background

Since 1983 Libyan troops had invaded Chad in support of the rebel Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) fighting against the Chadian government led by Hissène Habré. French military interventions had limited the Libyan-GUNT advance to the 16th parallel (the so-called Red Line), freezing the situation on the ground till 1986, when the bulk of the GUNT forces turned against their Libyan patrons, an opportunity that was immediately taken by Habré, that in December gave orders to his troops to attack Libyan positions in Northern Chad. Starting with Fada and continuing with B'ir Kora and Ouadi Doum, the Chadian National Armed Forces' (FANT) commander-in-chief Hassan Djamous reported a series of victories that forced Libyan forces to fall back on the Aouzou Strip.

Ignoring French pleas for restraint, Habré assumed a militant attitude towards the Libyan occupation of the Aouzou Strip; his troops successfully took Aouzou on August 8, but were repulsed on August 28, partly due to French refusal to provide air cover for Habré's attempt to regain Aouzou.

Attack

Already before the final Libyan assault Habré had withdrawn Djamous and most of his veteran troops projecting to let them repose for a new offensive that would secure once and for all the Strip. Habré, judging by the decisive role played in the setback at Aouzou by close-range Libyan air strikes, concluded that Libya's greatest advantage was its ability to conduct endless airstrikes. To remove this asset Habré ordered Djamous to destroy with 2,000 troops the main Libyan airbase in southern Libya, Maaten al-Sarra, 60 miles north of the Chadian-Libyan border. Habré may also have been encouraged in his raid by French President François Mitterrand's public declaration on September 3 that the Red Line was obsolete and thus French troops in Chad would not be binded by it any more.

Chadian military preparations were made for what was taken for an attempt to retake Aouzou once again; instead, encouraged by the United States that supplied satellite intelligence, the FANT attacked on September 5 Maaten al-Sarra, taking completely by surprise the Libyans, and apparently also the French, that reacted by refusing to provide intelligence or logistic support. Djamous' troops were careful to follow the wadis, thus avoiding to expose themselves, and also took advantage of Libyan carelessness in patrolling and security, consenting to take the airbase's garrison and its defenders by surprise. To majorly confuse the Libyans the FANT forces had first proceeded north and northwest in Libyan territory, in a second moment turning left and descending over Maaten al-Sarra; as a result, the Libyan officers took them for reinforcements and attempted to join them.

Nowithstanding its 2,500-strong garrison, brigade of tanks, artillery and extensive fortifications, the Chadian troops rapidly overcame the Libyan forces and assumed control of the base, starkly revealing the professional incompetence of the Libyan military. While the FANT's losses were minor, Libya suffered staggering casulties, with 1,713 Libyans killed, 300 taken prisoners and hundreds of others were forced to flee into the surrounding desert. The Chadians then proceeded to demolish all the equipment they could not bring with them, such as 70 tanks, 30 APCs, 8 radar stations, a radar scrambling device, numerous SAMs, 26 aircraft - including 3 Mig-23, 1 Mi-24, 4 Mirages, and made unoperative the base's two runways. Then, traveling without lights beneath the moon and stars, the FANT column withdrew to Chadian soil on September 6, while the Chadian government declared that the battle "must be written in gold letters in the great book of victories."

Reactions

Gaddafi's first reaction was to place the blame for the defeat on the French, challenging their position in Chad. A couple of days after Djamous' raid on Maaten two Tu-22 were dispatched against N'Djamena, the Chadian capital, and other two towards Abéché; the air raid was unsuccessful, as the Tupolev attacking the capital was shot down by a French Army Hawk SAM battery, while the second plane was forced to return to Libya without dropping its bombs. Libya's reaction to the downing was to publicly accuse the Maaten raid of being a "combined Franco-American military action", and added that France and the United States were "behind the aggression against Libya."

While the United States did not conceal its satisfaction for the Libyan defeat, a US official adding that "We basically jump for joy every time the Chadians ding the Libyans", France reacted differently, with the Defence Minister Andre Giraud expressing "deepest regrets" over the escalation. The French appeared to have judged the battle of Maaten al-Sarra even too successful for Habré, giving way to concerns that the battle was only the first stage of a general invasion of Libya, a thing that France wanted to avoid at all costs; therefore, on September 11 Mitterrand pressed Habré in agreeing to a ceasefire with Gaddafi, the Libyan leader accepting due to internal demoralization and foreign hostility. While the ceasefire was subject to many minor violations, it substantially resisted, thus putting an end to the Chadian-Libyan conflict.

Referensi

• Azevedo, Mario J. (1998). Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad. Routledge. ISBN 90-5699-582-0. 
• Collelo, Thomas (1990). Chad. US GPO. ISBN 0-1602-4770-5. 
• Nolutshungu, Sam C. (1995). Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad. University of Virginia Press. ISBN 0-8139-1628-3. 
• Pollack, Kenneth M. (2002). Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-3733-2. 
• Popper, Steven W. (1989). The Economic Cost of Soviet Military Manpower Requirements. RAND. ISBN 0-8330-0934-6. 
• Vanderwalle, Dirk J. (2006). A History of Modern Libya. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-5218-5048-7.