Templat:Good article

Armenian genocide
Bagian dari World War I
Column of Armenian deportees guarded by gendarmes in Harput Vilayet
LokasiOttoman Empire
Tanggal1915–1917[1][2]
SasaranOttoman Armenians
Jenis serangan
Genocide, death march, forced Islamization
Korban tewas
600,000–1.5 million[3]
PelakuCommittee of Union and Progress
TrialsOttoman Special Military Tribunal

The Armenian genocide[a] was the systematic destruction of ethnic Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Spearheaded by the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), it was accomplished primarily through the mass murder of around one million Armenians during death marches leading to the Syrian Desert and the forced Islamization of Armenian women and children.

Prior to World War I, Armenians were concentrated in Eastern Anatolia and occupied a protected, but subordinate, place in Ottoman society. Large-scale massacres of Armenians occurred in the 1890s and 1909. The Ottoman Empire suffered a series of military defeats and territorial losses—especially the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars—leading to fear among CUP leaders that the Armenians, whose homeland in the eastern provinces was viewed as the heartland of the Turkish nation, would also attempt to break free of the empire. During their invasion of Russian and Persian territory, Ottoman paramilitaries massacred local Armenians. Ottoman leaders took isolated indications of Armenian resistance as evidence of a widespread rebellion, even though no such rebellion existed. Mass deportation was intended as the "definitive solution to the Armenian Question" and to permanently forestall the possibility of Armenian autonomy or independence.

On 24 April 1915, the Ottoman authorities arrested and deported hundreds of Armenian intellectuals and leaders from Constantinople. At the orders of Talaat Pasha, an estimated 800,000 to 1.2 million Armenian women, children, and elderly or infirm people were sent on death marches leading to the Syrian Desert in 1915 and 1916. Driven forward by paramilitary escorts, the deportees were deprived of food and water and subjected to robbery, rape, and massacres. In the Syrian Desert, the survivors were dispersed into concentration camps. In 1916 another wave of massacres was ordered, leaving about 200,000 deportees alive by the end of 1916. Around 100,000 to 200,000 Armenian women and children were forcibly converted to Islam and integrated into Muslim households. Massacres and ethnic cleansing of Armenian survivors were carried out by the Turkish nationalist movement during the Turkish War of Independence after World War I.

The Armenian genocide resulted in the destruction of more than two millennia of Armenian civilization in eastern Anatolia. With the destruction and expulsion of Syriac and Greek Orthodox Christians, it enabled the creation of an ethnonational Turkish state. Hingga 2021, 31 countries have recognized the events as genocide, as do the vast majority of historians. The Turkish government maintains that the deportation of Armenians was a legitimate action that cannot be described as a genocide.

Latar belakang

Orang Armenia di Kesultanan Utsmaniyah

 
Peta yang menunjukkan persebaran populasi Armenia, diterbitkan tahun 1896

Keberadaan orang Armenia di Anatolia telah tercatat oleh sejarah semenjak abad ke-6 SM, lebih dari satu milenium sebelum invasi orang Turk.[4][5] Kerajaan Armenia menjadikan agama Kristen sebagai agama negara pada abad ke-4 M dan mendirikan Gereja Apostolik Armenia.[6] Setelah runtuhnya Kekaisaran Romawi Timur pada tahun 1453, terdapat dua negara Islam yang saling memperebutkan kawasan Armenia Barat, yaitu Kesultanan Utsmaniyah dan Dinasti Safawiyah Iran. Wilayah Armenia Barat kemudian dipisahkan secara permanen dari Armenia Timur (yang dikendalikan oleh Dinasi Safawiyah) sesuai dengan ketentuan Perjanjian Zuhab tahun 1639.[7] Kesultanan Utsmaniyah sendiri merupakan negeri dengan keanekaragaman etnis dan agama.[8] Walaupun sistem milet memberikan perlindungan terhadap kaum non-Muslim, kedudukan mereka tidak setara dengan umat Muslim.[9] Syariat Islam memberikan berbagai hak dan keistimewaan kepada kaum Muslim, tetapi juga menjamin hak atas harta benda dan kebebasan beribadah kepada kelompok non-Muslim yang disebut dhimmi asalkan mereka membayar jizyah.[10]

Pada permulaan Perang Dunia I, terdapat sekitar dua juta orang Armenia yang tinggal di Anatolia, sementara jumlah penduduk kawasan tersebut secara keseluruhan berkisar 15–17,5 juta.[11] Menurut perkiraan Kebatrikan Armenia untuk tahun 1913–1914, terdapat 2.925 kota dan desa Armenia di Kesultanan Utsmaniyah, dengan 2.084 dari antaranya berada di Dataran Tinggi Armenia di vilayet (provinsi) Bitlis, Diyarbekir, Erzerum, Harput, dan Van.[12] Orang Armenia merupakan golongan minoritas di sebagian besar wilayah yang mereka tinggali, dan mereka hidup berdampingan dengan orang Turki, Kurdi, dan Kristen Ortodoks Yunani.[11][12] Menurut perkiraan Kebatrikan Armenia, 215.131 orang Armenia hidup di kawasan perkotaan, khususnya di Konstantinopel, Smirna, dan Trakia Timur.[12] Meskipun sebagian besar orang Armenia Utsmaniyah adalah rakyat jelata yang bermata pencaharian sebagai petani, mereka menguasai sektor perdagangan. Sebagai minoritas perantara, beberapa orang Armenia menikmati kekayaan, tetapi kekuatan politik mereka terbilang rendah, sehingga orang Armenia merupakan kelompok yang rentan.[13]

Konflik dan reformasi lahan

 
"Penjarahan di sebuah desa Armenia oleh kelompok Kurdi", pada tahun 1898 atau 1899

Orang-orang Armenia di provinsi-provinsi timur Kesultanan Utsmaniyah tinggal dalam suatu masyarakat semi-feodal dan umumnya menjadi korban kerja paksa, pemungutan pajak ilegal, dan kejahatan-kejahatan yang pada akhirnya tidak diusut seperti perampokan, pembunuhan, dan pelecehan seksual.[14][15] Pada pertengahan abad ke-19, Pemerintah Utsmaniyah melancarkan reformasi Tanzimat, yaitu serangkaian kebijakan yang mempersamakan status orang-orang di bawah Pemerintah Utsmaniyah terlepas dari agama mereka. Namun, kebijakan ini menuai kecaman dari para ulama dan orang-orang Muslim pada umumnya. Mayoritas kebijakan ini juga tidak pernah diimplementasikan.[16][17][18] Walaupun begitu, beberapa kelompok Islamis mengemukakan bahwa dengan melakukan reformasi untuk kesetaraan, orang-orang non-Muslim akan kehilangan perlindungan yang mereka nikmati berdasarkan syariat Islam.[19] Undang-Undang Agraria Utsmaniyah tahun 1858 merugikan orang-orang Armenia dan banyak dari mereka yang diharuskan membayar pajak berganda kepada tuan tanah Kurdi dan Pemerintah Utsmaniyah.[20] Situasi yang dialami oleh rakyat jelata Armenia di provinsi-provinsi timur mengalami kemunduran sejak tahun 1860.[21]

Sejak pertengahan abad ke-19, orang-orang Armenia mengalami penyerobotan lahan sebagai akibat dari berpindahnya masyarakat Kurdi dari gaya hidup nomaden menjadi menetap. Selain itu, penyerobotan lahan tanah ini juga disebabkan oleh kedatangan pencari suaka dan imigran Muslim (terutama orang-orang Sirkasia) sebagai akibat dari Perang Rusia-Sirkasia.[22][23][24] Pada tahun 1876, ketika Sultan Abdul Hamid II naik takhta, Pemerintah Utsmaniyah mengambil lahan milik orang-orang Armenia di provinsi-provinsi timur dan memberikannya kepada imigran Muslim sebagai bagian dari kebijakan sistematis untuk mengurangi populasi Armenia di daerah ini; kebijakan ini dilaksanakan sampai masa Perang Dunia Pertama.[25][26] Situasi ini menyebabkan penurunan jumlah populasi di dataran tinggi Armenia secara signifikan; 300.000 orang Armenia meninggalkan Kesultanan Utsmaniyah, sementara orang-orang Armenia lainnya pindah ke kota-kota.[27][28] Sebagian orang-orang Armenia bergabung dengan partai politik revolusioner; salah satu yang paling berpengaruh ialah Federasi Revolusi Armenia (ARF) yang didirikan pada tahun 1890. Partai-partai ini pada pokoknya bertujuan untuk melakukan reformasi, tetapi hanya memperoleh sedikit dukungan dari orang-orang Armenia di Kesultanan Utsmaniyah.[29]

Seusai kekalahannya dalam perang melawan Rusia pada tahun 1877-1878, Kesultanan Utsmaniyah terpaksa melepaskan sebagian wilayahnya di Anatolia Timur dan Balkan, sementara wilayah Siprus juga direlakan kepada Britania sebagai ganti atas jaminan perlindungan dari serangan Rusia.[30] Kemudian, akibat tekanan internasional dari Kongres Berlin yang diselenggarakan pada tahun 1878, Pemerintah Utsmaniyah menyatakan kesediaannya untuk melakukan reformasi dan menjamin keselamatan orang-orang Armenia. Namun, tidak ada mekanisme untuk menjamin penegakan komitmen ini,[31] dan situasi orang Armenia terus memburuk.[32][33] Kongres Berlin menandai munculnya permasalahan Armenia dalam diplomasi internasional karena isu mengenai orang-orang Armenia untuk pertama kalinya dijadikan dalih oleh negara-negara besar Eropa untuk melakukan intervensi politik terhadap Kesultanan Utsmaniyah.[34] Meskipun orang-orang Armenia telah dianggap sebagai komunitas yang setia (tidak seperti orang-orang Yunani dan kelompok lainnya yang pernah memberontak), Pemerintah Utsmaniyah mulai menganggap orang-orang Armenia sebagai ancaman setelah tahun 1878.[35] Pada tahun 1891, Abdul Hamid membentuk resimen Hamidiye yang berasal dari kelompok Kurdi, dan resimen ini diperbolehkan melakukan tindakan sewenang-wenang terhadap orang-orang Armenia.[36][32] Dari tahun 1895 sampai 1896, terjadi pembantaian besar-besaran di Kesultanan Utsmaniyah; setidaknya 100.000 orang Armenia dibunuh[37][38] oleh tentara-tentara Utsmaniyah dan massa yang dibiarkan oleh aparat.[39] Banyak desa di Armenia yang dipaksa masuk Islam.[27] Pemerintah Utsmaniyah bertanggung jawab penuh atas pembantaian itu,[40][41] dengan tujuan untuk mengembalikan tatanan sosial sebelumnya (yaitu ketika orang-orang Kristen tidak mempertanyakan supremasi orang-orang Muslim)[42][43] serta untuk memaksa orang Armenia pindah dan mengurangi jumlah mereka.[44]

Revolusi Turki Muda

Kekuasaan Abdul Hamid yang sewenang-wenang memicu pembentukan kelompok oposisi yang disebut golongan Turki Muda. Mereka berupaya menjatuhkan Abdul Hamid dan mengembalikan Undang-Undang Dasar Kesultanan Utsmaniyah tahun 1876 , yang sebelumnya telah ditanggukan sang Sultan pada tahun 1877.[45] Salah satu faksi di golongan Turki Muda adalah Komite Persatuan dan Kemajuan (CUP) yang bersifat rahasia dan revolusioner. Faksi ini berbasis di Salonica (kini Thessaloniki, Yunani), dan Mehmed Talaat (kelak disebut Talaat Pasha) berperan sebagai pemimpinnya.[46] Walaupun merasa ragu dengan bangkitnya nasionalisme Turki yang bersifat eksklisif di dalam golongan Turki Muda, ARF memutuskan untuk bersekutu dengan CUP pada Desember 1907.[47][48] Pada tahun 1908, CUP melancarkan Revolusi Turki Muda dan berhasil merebut kekuasaan. Revolusi ini dimulai dengan serangkaian pembunuhan terhadap pejabat-pejabat di kawasan Makedonia.[49][50] Abdul Hamid terpaksa mengembalikan Undang-Undang Dasar tahun 1876 dan membentuk kembali parlemen, dan hal ini didukung oleh orang-orang Utsmaniyah dari berbagai suku dan agama.[51][52] Setelah tahun 1908, keamanan di provinsi-provinsi timur membaik,[53] tetapi CUP tidak mengembalikan lahan-lahan orang Armenia yang telah diserobot pada dasawarsa-dasawarsa sebelumnya.[54]

 
Kawasan orang Armenia di kota Adana setelah berlangsungnya pembantaian tahun 1909

Pada awal tahun 1909, kelompok konservatif dan beberapa orang liberal melancarkan upaya kudeta balasan pada tahun 1909, karena mereka menentang pemerintahan CUP yang semakin menindas, tetapi upaya ini mengalami kegagalan.[55] Saat kabar mengenai kudeta balasan mencapai kota Adana, kelompok Muslim bersenjata menyerang daerah orang Armenia, dan orang Armenia kemudian membalasnya. Tentara Utsmaniyah tidak melindungi oleh orang Armenia dan malah mempersenjatai para perusuh.[56] Sekitar 20.000 hingga 25.000 orang Armenia dibantai di Adana dan kota-kota sekitar.[57] Tidak seperti pembantaian tahun 1890-an, peristiwa ini tidak didalangi oleh pemerintah pusat, tetapi dipicu oleh pejabat setempat, cendekiawan, dan ulama, termasuk pendukung CUP di Adana.[58] Meskipun para pelaku pembantaian ini tidak pernah dihukum, ARF terus berharap bahwa akan dilancarkan reformasi yang akan meningkatkan keamanan dan mengembalikan lahan. Akhirnya, pada akhir tahun 1912, ARF memutus hubungan dengan CUP dan meminta bantuan negara-negara Eropa.[59][60][61] Pada 8 Februari 1914, CUP mau tidak mau harus menyetujui reformasi Armenia 1914 yang diprakarsai oleh komunitas internasional dan dimediasi oleh Kekaisaran Jerman. Menurut kebijakan ini, dua inspektur Eropa akan diangkat untuk seluruh kawasan timur Utsmaniyah, sementara rezimen Hamidiye akan dicadangkan. Reformasi ini pada akhirnya tidak pernah diwujudkan akibat meletusnya Perang Dunia I. Para pemimpin CUP sendiri merasa khawatir bahwa apabila kebijakan tersebut dilaksanakan, wilayah Utsmaniyah akan terpecah. Mereka bahkan menjadikan reformasi ini sebagai salah satu alasan untuk membinasakan orang Armenia pada tahun 1915.[62][63][64]

Peperangan Balkan

 
Sejumlah penyamun Muslim (yang disebut Çetes) mempertunjukkan hasil jarahan mereka di Phocaea (kini dikenal dengan nama Foça di Turki) pada tanggal 13 Juni 1914. Di latar belakang terdapat sejumlah pencari suaka Yunani dan gedung-gedung yang terbakar.

Perang Balkan Pertama pada tahun 1912 mengakibatkan lepasnya hampir keseluruhan wilayah Kesultanan Utsmaniyah di Eropa[65] serta pengusiran orang-orang Muslim dari daerah Balkan.[66] Masyarakat Muslim di Kesultanan Utsmaniyah tersulut oleh kekejaman yang dilakukan terhadap orang-orang Muslim Balkan. Hal ini memperkuat sentimen anti-Kristen dan menimbulkan keinginan untuk membalas dendam.[67][68] Orang-orang Kristen dijadikan kambing hitam atas kekalahan tersebut, termasuk orang-orang Armenia yang turut berjuang di pihak Kesultanan Utsmaniyah.[69] Perang Balkan mengakhiri kebijakan Otomanisme yang berupaya mewujudkan pluralisme dan kehidupan bersama,[70] malahan CUP berubah menjadi gerakan radikal nasionalis Turki yang berupaya mempertahankan Kesultanan Utsmaniyah.[71] Para pemimpin CUP seperti Talaat dan Enver Pasha menyalahkan populasi non-Muslim yang tinggal di kawasan-kawasan strategis atas masalah-masalah yang ada di Kesultanan Utsmaniyah. Mereka bahkan menyimpulkan pada pertengahan tahun 1914 bahwa populasi non-Muslim ini adalah "tumor" yang perlu diberantas.[72] Di antara orang-orang non-Muslim ini, orang-orang Armenia dianggap yang paling berbahaya karena para pemimpin CUP mengkhawatirkan bahwa tanah air mereka di Anatolia (yang diklaim sebagai tempat perlindungan terakhir bagi bangsa Turki) akan berubah menjadi seperti Makedonia yang telah menjadi wilayah Yunani.[73][74][71]

Pada bulan Januari 1913, CUP melancarkan kudeta, membentuk sebuah negara satu partai, dan menindas semua pihak yang dianggap sebagai musuh dari dalam.[75][76] Setelah kudeta ini, CUP mengubah batas-batas kesukuan dengan memukimkan kembali orang-orang Muslim Balkan dan memaksa orang-orang Kristen untuk hengkang; para imigran dijanjikan harta benda yang sebelumnya dimiliki oleh orang-orang Kristen.[77] Ketika sebagian dari Trakia Timur diduduki kembali oleh Kesultanan Utsmaniyah dalam Perang Balkan Kedua pada pertengahan tahun 1913, terjadi penjarahan dan intimidasi terhadap orang-orang Yunani dan Armenia yang mengakibatkan mereka mengungsi.[78] Sekitar 150.000 orang Ortodoks Yunani di kawasan pesisir Aegea dideportasi secara paksa pada bulan Mei dan Juni 1914 oleh kelompok penyamun Muslim (disebut Çetes) yang diam-diam didukung oleh CUP, walaupun ada pula tentara yang ikut serta.[79][80][81] Sejarawan Matthias Bjørnlund berpendapat bahwa keyakinan mengenai keberhasilan deportasi orang Yunani mendorong para pemimpin CUP untuk merencanakan kebijakan yang lebih radikal dengan maksud untuk melakukan Turkifikasi terhadap masyarakat Utsmaniyah.[82]

Ottoman entry into World War I

 
"Revenge" (Turki Otoman: انتقام) map highlighting territory lost during and after the Balkan Wars in black.

A few days after the outbreak of World War I, the CUP concluded an alliance with Germany on 2 August 1914.[83] The same month, CUP representatives went to an ARF conference demanding that, in the event of war with Russia, the ARF incite Russian Armenians to intervene on the Ottoman side. Instead, the delegates resolved that Armenians should fight for the countries of their citizenships.[84] During its war preparations, the Ottoman government recruited thousands of prisoners to join the paramilitary Special Organization,[85] which initially focused on stirring up revolts among Muslims behind Russian lines beginning before the Ottoman Empire officially entered the war.[86] On 29 October 1914, the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers by launching a surprise attack on Russian ports in the Black Sea.[87] Many Russian Armenians were enthusiastic about the war, hoping to "liberate Turkish Armenia", but Ottoman Armenians were more ambivalent, afraid that supporting Russia would bring retaliation. Organization of Armenian volunteer units by Russian Armenians, later joined by some Ottoman Armenian deserters, further increased Ottoman suspicions against their Armenian population.[88]

Wartime requisitions were often corrupt and arbitrary, and disproportionately targeted Greeks and Armenians.[89] Armenian leaders urged young men to accept conscription into the army, but many soldiers of all ethnicities and religions deserted due to difficult conditions and concern for their families.[90] At least 10 percent of Ottoman Armenians were mobilized, leaving their communities bereft of fighting-age men and therefore largely unable to organize armed resistance to deportation in 1915.[91][92] During the Ottoman invasion of Russian and Persian territory, the Special Organization massacred local Armenians and Syriac Christians.[93][94] Beginning in November 1914, provincial governors of Van, Bitlis, and Erzerum sent many telegrams to the central government pressing for more severe measures against the Armenians, both regionally and throughout the empire.[95] These pressures played a key role in the intensification of anti-Armenian persecution, endorsed by the central government already before 1915.[96] Armenian civil servants were dismissed from their posts in late 1914 and early 1915.[97] In February 1915, the CUP leaders decided to disarm Armenians serving in the army and transfer them to labor battalions.[98] The Armenian soldiers in labor battalions were systematically executed, although many skilled workers were spared until 1916.[99]

Onset of genocide

 
Armenian defenders in Van
 
Russian soldiers pictured in the former Armenian village of Sheykhalan near Mush, 1915

Minister of War Enver Pasha took over command of the Ottoman armies for the invasion of Russian territory, and tried to encircle the Russian Caucasus Army at the Battle of Sarikamish, fought from December 1914 to January 1915. Unprepared for the harsh winter conditions,[100] his forces were routed, losing more than 60,000 men.[101] The retreating Ottoman army indiscriminately destroyed dozens of Ottoman Armenian villages in Bitlis Vilayet, massacring their inhabitants.[97] Enver publicly blamed his defeat on Armenians who he claimed had actively sided with the Russians, a theory that became a consensus among CUP leaders.[102][103] Any local incident or discovery of arms in the possession of Armenians was cited as evidence for a coordinated conspiracy against the empire.[98] Historian Taner Akçam concludes that "the allegations of an Armenian revolt in the documents ... have no basis in reality but were deliberately fabricated".[104][105]

Massacres of Armenian men were occurring in the vicinity of Bashkale in Van vilayet from December.[106] ARF leaders attempted to keep the situation calm, warning that even justifiable self-defense could lead to escalation of killing.[107] The governor, Djevdet Bey, ordered the Armenians of Van to hand over their arms on 18 April, creating a dilemma: If they obeyed, the Armenians expected to be killed, but if they refused, it would provide a pretext for massacres. Armenians fortified themselves in Van and repelled the Ottoman attack that began on 20 April.[108][109] During the siege, Armenians in surrounding villages were massacred at Djevdet's orders. Russian forces captured Van on 18 May, finding 55,000 corpses in the province—about half its prewar Armenian population.[110] Djevdet's forces proceeded to Bitlis and attacked Armenian and Syriac villages; men were killed immediately, women and children kidnapped by local Kurds, and others marched away to be killed later. By the end of June, there were only a dozen Armenians in the vilayet.[111]

The first deportations of Armenians were proposed by Djemal Pasha in February 1915 and targeted Armenians in Cilicia (specifically Alexandretta, Dörtyol, Adana, Hadjin, Zeytun, and Sis) who were relocated to the area around Konya in central Anatolia.[112] In late March or early April, the CUP Central Committee decided on the large-scale removal of Armenians from areas near the front lines.[113] During the night of 23–24 April 1915 hundreds of Armenian political activists, intellectuals, and community leaders were rounded up in Constantinople and across the empire. This order from Talaat, intended to eliminate the Armenian leadership and anyone capable of organizing resistance, eventually resulted in the murder of most of those arrested.[114][115][116] The same day, Talaat ordered the shuttering of all Armenian political organizations[117] and diverted the Armenians who had previously been removed from Cilicia from central Anatolia, where they would likely have survived, to the Syrian Desert.[118][119]

Systematic deportations

Aims

We have been blamed for not making a distinction between guilty and innocent Armenians. [To do so] was impossible. Because of the nature of things, one who was still innocent today could be guilty tomorrow. The concern for the safety of Turkey simply had to silence all other concerns. Our actions were determined by national and historical necessity.

—Talaat Pasha, Berliner Tageblatt, 4 May 1915[120]

During World War I, the CUP—whose central goal was to preserve the Ottoman Empire—came to identify Armenian civilians as an existential threat.[121][122] CUP leaders held Armenians—including women and children—collectively guilty for "betraying" the empire, a belief that was crucial to deciding on genocide in early 1915.[123][124] At the same time, the war provided an opportunity to enact, in Talaat's words, the "definitive solution to the Armenian Question".[122][125] The CUP hoped to permanently eliminate any possibility that Armenians could achieve autonomy or independence in the empire's eastern provinces by annihilating the concentrated Armenian population of these areas.[126] Ottoman records show the government aimed to reduce the population of Armenians to no more than 5 percent in the sources of deportation and 10 percent in the destination areas. This goal could not be accomplished without mass murder.[127][128][129]

The deportation of Armenians and resettlement of Muslims in their lands was part of a broader project intended to permanently restructure the demographics of Anatolia.[130][131][132] Armenian homes, businesses, and land were preferentially allocated to Muslims from outside the empire, nomads, and the estimated 800,000 (largely Kurdish) Ottoman subjects displaced because of the war with Russia. Resettled Muslims were spread out (typically limited to 10 percent in any area) among larger Turkish populations so that they would lose their distinctive characteristics, such as non-Turkish languages or nomadism.[133] These migrants were exposed to harsh conditions and, in some cases, violence or restriction from leaving their new villages.[134] The ethnic cleansing of Anatolia—the Armenian genocide, Assyrian genocide, and expulsion of Greeks after World War I—paved the way for the formation of an ethno-national Turkish state.[135][136] In September 1918, Talaat emphasized his completion of the most important war aim: "transforming Turkey to a nation-state in Anatolia".[137]

Deportation amounted to a death sentence; the authorities planned for and intended the death of the deportees.[138][139][140] Deportation was only carried out behind the front lines, where no active rebellion existed, and was only possible in the absence of widespread resistance. Armenians who lived in the war zone were instead killed in massacres.[141] Although ostensibly undertaken for military reasons,[142] the deportation and murder of Armenians did not grant the empire any military advantage and actually undermined the Ottoman war effort.[143] The empire faced a dilemma between its goal of eliminating Armenians and its practical need for their labor; those Armenians retained for their skills, in particular for manufacturing in war industries, were indispensable to the logistics of the Ottoman Army.[144][145] By late 1915, the CUP had extinguished Armenian existence from eastern Anatolia.[146]

Map of the Armenian genocide in 1915

Administrative organization

 
Armenians gathered in a city prior to deportation. They were murdered outside the city.

On 23 May 1915, Talaat ordered the deportation of all Armenians in Van, Bitlis, and Erzerum.[147][148] To grant the deportation, already well underway in eastern Anatolia, a cover of legality, the Council of Ministers approved the Temporary Law of Deportation, which allowed authorities to deport anyone deemed "suspect".[148][149][150] On 21 June, Talaat ordered the deportation of all Armenians throughout the empire, even Adrianople, 2,000 kilometer (1,243 mi) from the Russian front.[151] Following the completion of deportation from other areas, in August 1915, deportation was extended to western Anatolia and European Turkey. Some areas with a very low Armenian population and some cities, including Constantinople, were partially spared from deportation.[152][153]

Overall, national, regional, and local levels of governance cooperated with the CUP in the perpetration of genocide.[154] The Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants (IAMM) coordinated the deportation and the resettlement of Muslim immigrants in the vacant houses and lands. The IAMM, under the control of Talaat's Ministry of the Interior and the Special Organization, which took orders directly from the CUP Central Committee, closely coordinated their activities.[155] A dual-track system was used to communicate orders; those for the deportation of Armenians were communicated to the provincial governors through official channels, but orders of criminal character, such as those calling for annihilation, were sent through party channels and destroyed upon receipt.[156][157] Deportation convoys were mostly escorted by gendarmes or local militia. The killings near the front lines were carried out by the Special Organization, and those farther away also involved local militias, bandits, gendarmes, or Kurdish tribes depending on the area.[158] Within the area controlled by the Third Army, which held eastern Anatolia, the army was only involved in genocidal atrocities in the vilayets of Van, Erzerum, and Bitlis.[159]

Many perpetrators came from the Caucasus (Chechens and Circassians), who identified the Armenians with their Russian conquerors. Nomadic Kurds committed many atrocities during the genocide, but settled Kurds only rarely did so.[160] Perpetrators had a variety of motives, including ideology, revenge, desire for Armenian property, and careerism.[161] In order to motivate perpetrators, state-appointed imams encouraged the killing of Armenians[162] and killers were entitled to a third of Armenian movable property (another third went to local authorities and the last to the CUP). Embezzling beyond that was punished.[163][164] Some Ottoman politicians and officials opposed the genocide, but they faced dismissal or assassination.[154][165][159] The government decreed that any Muslim who harbored an Armenian against the will of the authorities would be executed.[166][167]

Death marches

 
On 24 September 1915, United States consul Leslie Davis visited Lake Hazar and found nearby gorges choked with corpses and hundreds of bodies floating in the lake.[168]

Although the majority of able-bodied Armenian men had been conscripted into the army, others deserted, paid the exemption task, or fell outside the age range of conscription. Unlike in the Hamidian massacres or Adana events, massacres were usually not committed in the Armenian villages, to avoid destruction of property or unauthorized looting. Instead, the men were usually separated from the rest of the deportees during the first few days and executed. Few resisted, believing it would put their families in greater danger.[158] Boys above the age of twelve (sometimes fifteen) were treated as adult men.[169] Execution sites were chosen for proximity to major roads and for rugged terrain, lakes, wells, or cisterns to facilitate the concealment or disposal of corpses.[170][168][171] The convoys would stop at a nearby transit camp, where the escorts would demand a ransom from the Armenians. Those unable to pay were murdered.[158] Units of the Special Organization, often wearing gendarme uniforms, were stationed at the killing sites, while escorting gendarmes often did not participate in killing.[171]

At least 150,000 Armenians passed through Erzindjan from June 1915, where a series of transit camps were set up to control the flow of victims to the killing site at the nearby Kemah gorge.[172] Thousands of Armenians were killed near Lake Hazar, pushed by paramilitaries off the cliffs.[168] More than 500,000 Armenians passed through the Firincilar plain south of Malatya, one of the deadliest areas during the genocide. Arriving convoys, having passed through the plain to approach the Kahta highlands, would have found gorges already filled with corpses from previous convoys.[173][170] Many others were trapped in valleys of tributaries of the Tigris, Euphrates, or Murat River and systematically executed by the Special Organization.[174] Armenian men were often drowned by being tied together back-to-back before being thrown in the water, a method that was not used on women.[175]

 
The corpses of Armenians beside a road, a common sight along deportation routes

Authorities viewed disposal of bodies through rivers as a cheap and efficient method, but it caused widespread pollution downstream. So many bodies floated down the Tigris and Euphrates rivers that they sometimes blocked the rivers and needed to be cleared with explosives. Other rotting corpses became stuck to the riverbanks, while some traveled as far as the Persian Gulf. The rivers remained polluted long after the massacres, causing epidemics downstream.[176] Tens of thousands of Armenians died along the roads and their bodies were buried hastily or, more often, simply left beside the roads. Key roads threatened to become impassible due to the contamination of corpses, and typhus epidemics spread in nearby villages; the Ottoman government also wanted the corpses cleared to prevent photographic documentation. The Ottoman government ordered the corpses to be cleared as soon as possible, which was not uniformly followed.[177][178]

Women and children, who made up the great majority of deportees, were usually not executed immediately, but subjected to hard marches through mountainous terrain without food and water. Those who could not keep up were left to die or shot.[179] During 1915, some were forced to walk as far as 1,000 kilometer (0,621 mi) in the summer heat.[140] Some deportees from western Anatolia were allowed to travel by rail.[152] There was a distinction between the convoys from eastern Anatolia, which were eliminated almost in their entirety, and those from farther west, who made up most of those surviving to reach Syria.[180] For example, around 99% of Armenians deported from Erzerum did not reach their destination.[148]

Islamization

 
Islamized Armenians who were "rescued from Arabs" after the war

Islamization of Armenians was carried out as a systematic state policy involving the bureaucracy, police, judiciary, and clergy and was a major structural component of the genocide.[181][182] An estimated 100,000 to 200,000 Armenians were Islamized,[183] and it is estimated that as many as 2 million Turkish citizens may have at least one Armenian grandparent.[184] Some Armenians were allowed to convert to Islam and evade deportation, but where their numbers exceeded the 5 to 10 percent threshold, or where there was a risk of their being able to preserve their nationality and culture, the regime insisted on their physical destruction.[185] Talaat Pasha personally authorized conversion of Armenians and carefully tracked the loyalty of converted Armenians until the end of the war.[186] Although the first and most important step was conversion to Islam, the process also required the eradication of Armenian names, language, and culture, and for women, immediate marriage to a Muslim man.[187] Although Islamization was the most feasible opportunity for survival, it also transgressed Armenian moral and social norms.[186]

The CUP allowed Armenian women to marry into Muslim households, as these women had to convert to Islam and would lose their Armenian identity.[170] Young women and girls were often appropriated as house servants or sex slaves. Some boys were abducted to work as unfree laborers for individual Muslims.[170][188] Some children were forcibly seized, but others were sold or given up by their parents to save their lives.[189][190] Special state-run orphanages were also set up with strict procedures intending to deprive their charges of an Armenian identity.[191] Most Armenian children who survived the genocide endured exploitation, hard labor without pay, forced conversion to Islam, and physical and sexual abuse.[188]

Women and children who fell into Muslim hands during the journey typically ended up in Turkish or Kurdish hands, in contrast with those captured in Syria by Arabs and Bedouins.[192] Military commanders told their men to "do to [the women] whatever you wish", resulting in widespread rapes.[193] Although Armenian women tried to avoid sexual violence, suicide was often the only alternative.[194] Deportees were displayed naked in Damascus and sold as sex slaves in some areas, constituting an important source of income for accompanying gendarmes.[195] Some were sold in Arabian slave markets to Muslim Hajj pilgrims and ended up as far away as Tunisia or Algeria.[196]

Confiscation of property

 
Çankaya Mansion, the official residence of the president of Turkey, was confiscated from Ohannes Kasabian, an Armenian businessman, in 1915.[197]

A secondary motivation for genocide was the destruction of the Armenian bourgeoisie to make room for a Turkish and Muslim middle class[126] and build a statist "national economy" controlled by Muslim Turks.[160][198] The campaign to Turkify the economy began in June 1914 with a law that obliged many ethnic minority merchants to hire Muslims. Following the deportations, the businesses of the victims were taken over by Muslims who were often incompetent, leading to economic difficulties.[199] The genocide had catastrophic effects on the Ottoman economy; Muslims were disadvantaged by the deportation of skilled professionals and entire districts fell into famine following their farmers' deportation.[200] The Ottoman and Turkish governments passed a series of Abandoned Properties Laws to manage and redistribute property confiscated from Armenians.[201][202] Although the laws maintained that the state was simply administering the properties on behalf of the absent Armenians, there was no provision to return them to the owners—presuming that they had ceased to exist.[203]

Akçam and Ümit Kurt argue that "The Republic of Turkey and its legal system were built, in a sense, on the seizure of Armenian cultural, social, and economic wealth, and on the removal of the Armenian presence."[201] Confiscated property was often used to fund the deportation of Armenians and resettlement of Muslims, as well as for army, militia, and other government spending.[204] Ultimately it formed much of the basis of the economy of the post-1923 republic, endowing it with capital.[205] The dispossession and exile of Armenian competitors enabled many lower-class Turks (i.e. peasantry, soldiers, and laborers) to rise to the middle class.[205] Confiscation of Armenian assets continued into the second half of the twentieth century,[206] and in 2006 the National Security Council ruled that property records from 1915 must be kept closed to protect national security.[207] Outside of Istanbul, the traces of Armenian existence, including churches and monasteries, libraries, khachkars, and animal and place names, were systematically erased.[208][209][210]

Destination

 
An Armenian woman kneeling beside a dead child in a field outside of Aleppo
 
Khabur near Ras al-Ayn

The first arrivals in mid-1915 were accommodated in Aleppo. From mid-November, the convoys were denied access to the city and redirected along the Baghdad Railway or the Euphrates towards Mosul. The first transit camp was established at Sibil, east of Aleppo; one convoy would arrive each day while another would depart for Meskene or Deir ez-Zor.[211] Dozens of concentration camps were set up in Syria and Upper Mesopotamia.[212] By October 1915, some 870,000 deportees had reached Syria and Upper Mesopotamia. Most were repeatedly transferred between camps, being held in each camp for a few weeks, until there were very few survivors.[213] This strategy physically weakened the Armenians and spread disease, so much that some camps were shut down in late 1915 due to the threat of disease spreading to the Ottoman military.[214][215] In late 1915, the camps around Aleppo were liquidated and the survivors were forced to march to Ras al-Ayn; the camps around Ras al-Ayn were closed in early 1916 and the survivors sent to Deir ez-Zor.[216]

In general, Armenians were denied food and water during and after their forced march to the Syrian desert;[214][217] many died of starvation, exhaustion, or disease, especially dysentery, typhus, and pneumonia.[214][218] Some local officials gave Armenians food, while others took bribes to provide food and water.[214] Aid organizations were officially barred from providing food to the deportees, although some circumvented these prohibitions.[219] Survivors testified that some Armenians refused aid as they believed it would only prolong their suffering.[220] The guards raped female prisoners and also allowed Bedouins to raid the camps at night for looting and rape; some women were forced into marriage.[221][217] Thousands of Armenian children were sold to childless Turks, Arabs, and Jews, who would come to the camps to buy them from their parents.[213] In the western Levant governed by the Ottoman Fourth Army, commanded by Djemal Pasha, there were no concentration camps or large-scale massacres, rather Armenians were resettled and recruited to work for the war effort. They had to convert to Islam or face deportation to another area.[222]

Armenian ability to adapt and survive was greater than the perpetrators expected.[138][223] A loosely organized, Armenian-led resistance network based in Aleppo succeeded in helping many deportees, saving Armenian lives.[224] At the beginning of 1916 some 500,000 deportees were alive in Syria and Mesopotamia.[180] Afraid that surviving Armenians might return home after the war, Talaat Pasha ordered a second wave of massacres in February 1916.[225] An additional wave of deportations targeted Armenians remaining in Anatolia.[226] More than 200,000 Armenians were killed between March and October 1916, often in remote areas near Deir ez-Zor and on parts of the Khabur valley, where their bodies would not create a public health hazard.[227][228] The massacres killed most of the Armenians who had survived the camp system.[216]

International reaction

 
Fundraising poster for Near East Relief

The Ottoman Empire tried to prevent journalists and photographers from documenting the atrocities, threatening them with arrest.[229][230] Nevertheless, substantiated reports of mass killings were widely covered in Western newspapers.[231][232] On 24 May 1915, the Triple Entente (Russia, Britain, and France) formally condemned the Ottoman Empire for "crimes against humanity and civilization", and threatened to hold the perpetrators accountable.[233] Crimes against humanity later became a category of international criminal law after World War II.[234] Witness testimony was published in books such as The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire (1916) and Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (1918), which raised public awareness about the genocide.[235]

The German Empire was a military ally of the Ottoman Empire during World War I.[236] German diplomats approved limited removals of Armenians in early 1915, and took no action against the genocide,[237][238] which has been a source of controversy.[236][239]

Relief efforts were organized in dozens of countries to raise money for Armenian survivors. By 1925, people in 49 countries were organizing "Golden Rule Sundays" during which they consumed the diet of Armenian refugees, to raise money for humanitarian efforts.[240] Between 1915 and 1930, Near East Relief raised $110 million ($165,0 billion adjusted for inflation) for refugees from the Ottoman Empire.[241]

Aftermath

End of World War I

 
Percent of prewar Armenian population "unaccounted for" in 1917 based on Talaat Pasha's record. Black indicates that 100 percent of Armenians have disappeared. "Resettlement" zone is displayed in red.

Intentional, state-sponsored killing of Armenians mostly ceased by the end of January 1917, although sporadic massacres and starvation continued.[242] Both contemporaries and later historians have estimated that around 1 million Armenians died during the genocide,[3][243][244] with figures ranging from 600,000 to 1.5 million deaths.[3] Between 800,000 to 1.2 million Armenians were deported,[245][246] and contemporaries estimate that by late 1916, only 200,000 were still alive.[245] As the British Army advanced in 1917 and 1918 northwards through the Levant, they liberated around 100,000 to 150,000 Armenians working for the Ottoman military under abysmal conditions, not including those held by Arab tribes.[247]

As a result of the Bolshevik Revolution and a subsequent separate peace with the Central Powers, the Russian army withdrew and Ottoman forces advanced into eastern Anatolia.[248] The First Republic of Armenia was proclaimed in May 1918, at which time 50 percent of its population were refugees and 60 percent of its territory was under Ottoman occupation.[249] Ottoman troops withdrew from parts of Armenia following the October 1918 Armistice of Mudros.[250] That year, at least 200,000 people in Armenia, mostly refugees, died from starvation or disease, in part due to a Turkish blockade of food supplies[251] and the deliberate destruction of crops in Eastern Armenia by Turkish troops, both before and after the armistice.[252]

Armenians organized a coordinated effort known as vorpahavak (terj. har.'the gathering of orphans') that reclaimed thousands of kidnapped Armenian women and children.[253] Armenian leaders abandoned traditional patrilineality to classify children born to Armenian women and their Muslim captors as Armenian.[254] An orphanage in Alexandropol held 25,000 orphans, the largest number in the world.[255] In 1920, the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople reported it was caring for 100,000 orphans, estimating that another 100,000 remained captive.[256] Although the postwar Ottoman government passed laws mandating the return of stolen Armenian property, in practice, 90 percent of Armenians were barred from returning to their homes, especially in eastern Anatolia.[257] The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres awarded Armenia a large area in eastern Anatolia, but was not ratified.[258]

Trials

Following the armistice, Allied governments championed the prosecution of war criminals.[259] Grand Vizier Damat Ferid Pasha publicly recognized that 800,000 Ottoman citizens of Armenian origin had died as a result of state policy[260] and helped initiate the Ottoman Special Military Tribunal.[261] The court ruled that "the crime of mass murder" of Armenians was "organized and carried out by the top leaders of CUP".[262] Eighteen perpetrators were sentenced to death, of whom only three were ultimately executed as the remainder had fled and were tried in absentia.[263][264] Prosecution was hampered by a widespread belief among Turkish Muslims that the actions against the Armenians were not punishable crimes.[160] Increasingly, the crimes were considered necessary and justified to establish a Turkish nation-state.[265]

 
Children evacuated from Harput by Near East Relief in 1922 or 1923
 
Refugee camp in Beirut, early 1920s

On 31 March 1923, the nationalist movement passed a law granting immunity to CUP war criminals.[266] Later that year, the Treaty of Lausanne established Turkey's current borders and provided for the Greek population's expulsion. Its minority protection provisions had no enforcement mechanism and were disregarded in practice.[267][268] On 15 March 1921, Talaat Pasha was assassinated in Berlin as part of Operation Nemesis, the 1920s covert operation of the ARF to kill the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide.[269][270][271] The trial of his admitted killer, Soghomon Tehlirian, focused on Talaat's responsibility for genocide. Tehlirian was acquitted.[272][273]

Turkish War of Independence

Remaining CUP cadres organized the Turkish nationalist movement to fight the Turkish War of Independence.[274][275] Historian Raymond Kévorkian states that the war was "intended to complete the genocide by finally eradicating Armenian, Greek, and Syriac survivors".[276] The nationalist movement depended on the support of perpetrators of the genocide and those who had profited from it.[277][278] In February 1920, after capturing Marash, Turkish insurgents massacred thousands of Armenian civilians.[279] Between 1922 and 1929, the Turkish authorities eliminated surviving Armenians from southern Turkey, expelling thousands to French-mandate Syria.[280] From 1918 to 1920, Armenian militants committed revenge killings of at most 40,000 to 60,000 Muslims, providing a retroactive excuse for genocide.[281][282][283] In 1920, Turkish general Kâzım Karabekir invaded Armenia with orders "to eliminate Armenia physically and politically". According to Kévorkian, only the Soviet occupation of Armenia prevented another genocide.[284]

Armenian survivors were left mainly in three locations. About 295,000 Armenians had fled to Russian-controlled territory during the genocide and ended up mostly in Soviet Armenia. An estimated 200,000 Armenian refugees settled in the Middle East, forming a new wave of the Armenian diaspora.[285] In the Republic of Turkey, about 100,000 Armenians lived in Constantinople and another 200,000 lived in the provinces, largely women and children who had been forcibly converted.[286] While Armenians in the capital faced discrimination, they were allowed to maintain their cultural identity, unlike those elsewhere in Turkey[286][287] who continued to face forced Islamization and kidnapping of girls after 1923.[288][289]

Legacy

According to historian Margaret Lavinia Anderson, the Armenian genocide reached an "iconic status" as "the apex of horrors conceivable" prior to World War II.[290] It was described by contemporaries as "the murder of a nation", "race extermination",[291] "the greatest crime of the ages", and "the blackest page in modern history".[292][293] Postwar Ottoman grand vizier Ferid said that "humanity, civilizations are shuddering, and forever will shudder, in face of this tragedy".[294] In Germany, the Nazis viewed post-1923 Turkey as a post-genocidal paradise and, according to historian Stefan Ihrig, "incorporated the Armenian genocide, its 'lessons', tactics, and 'benefits', into their own worldview".[295]

Turkey

Based on the CUP's justification of its actions, the Turkish government maintains that the mass deportation of Armenians was a legitimate action to combat an existential threat to the empire, but that there was no intention to exterminate the Armenian people.[296][297] All major political parties in Turkey except the Peoples' Democratic Party promote Armenian genocide denial,[298] a view that is also supported by the majority of Turkish citizens.[299] Many Kurds, however, who themselves have suffered political repression in Turkey, have recognized and condemned the genocide.[300][301] In 2007, Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, who had worked to promote reconciliation and acknowledgment of the genocide, was assassinated.[302][303]

The Turkish state perceives discussion of the genocide to threaten national security because of its connection with the foundation of the republic.[304] Acknowledgment of the genocide is punishable under Article 301 of the Penal Code, which prohibits insulting the Turkish nation and state institutions.[305] Turkey's century-long effort to prevent any recognition or mention of the genocide in foreign countries has included millions of dollars in lobbying,[306] as well as intimidation and threats.[307] Historian Donald Bloxham recognizes that since denial is accompanied by "rhetoric of Armenian treachery, aggression, criminality, and territorial ambition, it actually enunciates an ongoing if latent threat of Turkish 'revenge'" against Armenia.[308]

Armenia and Azerbaijan

 
Aerial view of the Armenian Genocide memorial complex on a hill above Yerevan

Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day is commemorated on 24 April each year in Armenia and abroad, the anniversary of the deportation of Armenian intellectuals.[309][310] On 24 April 1965, a hundred thousand Armenians protested in Yerevan, and diaspora Armenians demonstrated across the world in favor of recognition of the genocide and annexing land from Turkey.[311][309] A memorial was completed two years later, at Tsitsernakaberd above Yerevan.[309][312]

Since 1988, Armenians and Turkic Azeris have been involved in a protracted ethnic-territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian enclave internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. Initially involving peaceful demonstrations by Armenians, the conflict turned violent and has featured massacres by both sides, resulting in the displacement of more than half a million people.[313][314][315] During the conflict, the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments regularly accused each other of plotting genocide.[313] Azerbaijan also joined the Turkish effort to deny the Armenian genocide.[316]

International recognition

 
  National legislatures that have passed resolutions recognizing the Armenian genocide
  States that deny there was an Armenian genocide (Turkey and Azerbaijan)

In response to continuing denial by the Turkish state, many Armenian diaspora activists have lobbied for formal recognition of the Armenian genocide, an effort that has become a central concern of the Armenian diaspora.[317][318] From the 1970s onwards, many countries avoided recognition to preserve good relations with Turkey.[319] Hingga 2021, 31 countries have recognized the genocide, along with Pope Francis and the European Parliament.[320][321]

Cultural depictions

After meeting Armenian survivors in the Middle East, Austrian–Jewish writer Franz Werfel wrote The Forty Days of Musa Dagh (1933), a fictionalized retelling of the successful Armenian uprising in Musa Dagh, as a warning of the dangers of Nazism.[322] According to Ihrig, the book is among the most important works of twentieth-century literature to address genocide and "is still considered essential reading for Armenians worldwide".[323] The genocide became a central theme in English-language Armenian-American literature.[324] The first feature film about the Armenian genocide, Ravished Armenia, was released in 1919 as a fundraiser for Near East Relief, based on the account of survivor Aurora Mardiganian, who played herself.[325][326] More than 200 memorials have been erected in 32 countries to commemorate the event.[327]

Archives and historiography

The genocide is extensively documented in the archives of Germany, Austria, the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom,[328] as well as the Ottoman archives, despite systematic purges of incriminating documents by Turkey.[329] There are also thousands of eyewitness accounts from Western missionaries and Armenian survivors.[330][331][332] Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term genocide in 1944, became interested in war crimes after reading about the 1921 trial of Soghomon Tehlirian for the assassination of Talaat Pasha. Lemkin recognized the fate of the Armenians as one of the most significant genocides in the twentieth century.[333][334] Almost all historians and scholars outside of Turkey, and an increasing number of Turkish scholars, recognize the destruction of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as a genocide.[299][335]

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Sources

Books

Chapters

Journal articles

Templat:Armenian Genocide